Related papers: The incentive (in)compatibility of group-based qua…
Many organizations use algorithms that have a disparate impact, i.e., the benefits or harms of the algorithm fall disproportionately on certain social groups. Addressing an algorithm's disparate impact can be challenging, however, because…
As artificial intelligence plays an increasingly substantial role in decisions affecting humans and society, the accountability of automated decision systems has been receiving increasing attention from researchers and practitioners.…
Many definitions of business processes refer to business goals, value creation, or profits/gains of sorts. Nevertheless, the focus of formal methods research on business processes, like the well-known soundness property, lies on correctness…
An intelligent agent may in general pursue multiple procedural goals simultaneously, which may lead to arise some conflicts (incompatibilities) among them. In this paper, we focus on the incompatibilities that emerge due to resources…
During the first step of practical reasoning, i.e. deliberation, an intelligent agent generates a set of pursuable goals and then selects which of them he commits to achieve. An intelligent agent may in general generate multiple pursuable…
Concurrent games with a fixed number of agents have been thoroughly studied, with various solution concepts and objectives for the agents. In this paper, we consider concurrent games with an arbitrary number of agents, and study the problem…
Modern recommendation systems rely on the wisdom of the crowd to learn the optimal course of action. This induces an inherent mis-alignment of incentives between the system's objective to learn (explore) and the individual users' objective…
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…
Incentives play an important role in (security and IT) risk management of a large-scale organization with multiple autonomous divisions. This paper presents an incentive mechanism design framework for risk management based on a…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…
Employment selection processes that use automated hiring systems based on machine learning are becoming increasingly commonplace. Meanwhile, concerns about algorithmic direct and indirect discrimination that result from such systems are…
The accurate applicant selection for university education is imperative to ensure fairness and optimal use of institutional resources. Although various approaches are operational in tertiary educational institutions for selecting…
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…
Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated…
In a generalized tournament, players may have an arbitrary number of matches against each other and the outcome of the games is measured on a cardinal scale with a lower and upper bound. An axiomatic approach is applied to the problem of…
Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
Institutions can provide incentives to increase cooperation behaviour in a population where this behaviour is infrequent. This process is costly, and it is thus important to optimize the overall spending. This problem can be mathematically…
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…