Related papers: Stochastic Learning in Potential Games: Communicat…

Consider a multiplayer game, and assume a system level objective function, which the system wants to optimize, is given. This paper aims at accomplishing this goal via potential game theory when players can only get part of other players'…

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update…

Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…

Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the…

This paper presents a potential game approach for distributed cooperative selection of informative sensors, when the goal is to maximize the mutual information between the measurement variables and the quantities of interest. It is proved…

In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…

Stochastic games have become a prevalent framework for studying long-term multi-agent interactions, especially in the context of multi-agent reinforcement learning. In this work, we comprehensively investigate the concept of constant-memory…

Game theory offers an interpretable mathematical framework for modeling multi-agent interactions. However, its applicability in real-world robotics applications is hindered by several challenges, such as unknown agents' preferences and…

We propose a stochastic first-order algorithm to learn the rationality parameters of simultaneous and non-cooperative potential games, i.e., the parameters of the agents' optimization problems. Our technique combines (i.) an active-set step…

Fully cooperative multiagent systems - those in which agents share a joint utility model- is of special interest in AI. A key problem is that of ensuring that the actions of individual agents are coordinated, especially in settings where…

Multi-agent systems are prevalent in a wide range of domains including power systems, vehicular networks, and robotics. Two important problems to solve in these types of systems are how the intentions of non-coordinating agents can be…

Strategy learning in game environments with multi-agent is a challenging problem. Since each agent's reward is determined by the joint strategy, a greedy learning strategy that aims to maximize its own reward may fall into a local optimum.…

Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm…

In this paper, we consider distributed decision-making over stochastic communication links in multi-agent systems. We show how to extend the current literature on potential games with binary log-linear learning (which mainly focuses on…

While game theory is widely used to model strategic interactions, a natural question is where do the game representations come from? One answer is to learn the representations from data. If one wants to learn both the payoffs and the…

It is well known that reinforcement learning can be cast as inference in an appropriate probabilistic model. However, this commonly involves introducing a distribution over agent trajectories with probabilities proportional to exponentiated…

In this paper, we analyze the convergence of a distributed Robbins-Monro algorithm for both constrained and unconstrained optimization in multi-agent systems. The algorithm searches for local minima of a (nonconvex) objective function which…

We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret…

We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…

Traffic scenarios are inherently interactive. Multiple decision-makers predict the actions of others and choose strategies that maximize their rewards. We view these interactions from the perspective of game theory which introduces various…