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The paper deals with a class of parametrized equilibrium problems, where the objectives of the players do possess nonsmooth terms. The respective Nash equilibria can be characterized via a parameter-dependent variational inequality of the…
In multi-agent dynamic games, the Nash equilibrium state trajectory of each agent is determined by its cost function and the information pattern of the game. However, the cost and trajectory of each agent may be unavailable to the other…
In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied. The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game, which contains a leader and a large number of followers. Specifically, the followers confront a large-population Nash…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics is proposed. In this game, the agents' motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others' opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced…
Global games are a class of incomplete information games where the payoffs exhibit strategic complementarity leading to an incentive for the agents to coordinate their actions. Such games have been used to model scenarios in many…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to…
A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
We are interested in studying how heterogeneous agents can learn to communicate and cooperate with each other without being explicitly pre-programmed to do so. Motivated by this goal, we present and analyze a distributed solution to a…
This paper considers a game-theoretic framework for distributed machine learning problems over networks where the information acquisition at a node is modeled as a rational choice of a player. In the proposed game, players decide both the…
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to…
Two fundamental problems in computational game theory are computing a Nash equilibrium and learning to exploit opponents given observations of their play (opponent exploitation). The latter is perhaps even more important than the former:…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…
In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…