Related papers: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Information-Flow Cont…
The study of leakage measures for privacy has been a subject of intensive research and is an important aspect of understanding how privacy leaks occur in computer systems. Differential privacy has been a focal point in the privacy community…
Leaking information about the execution behavior of critical real-time tasks may lead to serious consequences, including violations of temporal constraints and even severe failures. We study information leakage for a special class of…
Two dynamic game forms are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the "same" profiles of structurally reduced strategies (Battigalli et al., 2020). In the context of dynamic implementation, behaviorally equivalent game forms are…
We consider linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games in which players have quadratic payoffs that depend on the players' actions and an unknown payoff-relevant state, and signals on the state that follow a Gaussian distribution conditional on…
Local differential privacy (LDP) is a variant of differential privacy (DP) that avoids the need for a trusted central curator, at the cost of a worse trade-off between privacy and utility. The shuffle model is a way to provide greater…
In adversarial settings, a mobile agent may strategically plan its motion to influence an opponent's inference about its intended goal. We study deceptive path planning in a scenario where a mobile agent aims to reach a privately selected…
We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…
Recently, recommender systems have achieved promising performances and become one of the most widely used web applications. However, recommender systems are often trained on highly sensitive user data, thus potential data leakage from…
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…
Today's high-stakes adversarial interactions feature attackers who constantly breach the ever-improving security measures. Deception mitigates the defender's loss by misleading the attacker to make suboptimal decisions. In order to formally…
Despite the conventional wisdom that proactive security is superior to reactive security, we show that reactive security can be competitive with proactive security as long as the reactive defender learns from past attacks instead of…
Cognitive vulnerabilities shape human decision-making and arise primarily from two sources: (1) cognitive capabilities, which include disparities in knowledge, education, expertise, or access to information, and (2) cognitive biases, such…
We consider a problem of guessing, wherein an adversary is interested in knowing the value of the realization of a discrete random variable $X$ on observing another correlated random variable $Y$. The adversary can make multiple (say, $k$)…
Covert planning refers to a class of constrained planning problems where an agent aims to accomplish a task with minimal information leaked to a passive observer to avoid detection. However, existing methods of covert planning often…
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…
In this paper we use game theoretic techniques to study the value of cooperation in distributed spectrum management problems. We show that the celebrated iterative water-filling algorithm is subject to the prisoner's dilemma and therefore…
Systems operating in adversarial environments may inadvertently leak sensitive information to adversaries. To address this challenge, we revisit the linear-quadratic control framework and introduce deception to actively mislead adversaries.…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
We propose InfoChess, a symmetric adversarial game that elevates competitive information acquisition to the primary objective. There is no piece capture, removing material incentives that would otherwise confound the role of information.…