Related papers: Unpopularity Factor in the Marriage and Roommates …
In this paper, we study the problem of eliciting preferences of agents in the house allocation model. For this we build on a recent model of Hosseini et al.[AAAI'21] and focus on the task of eliciting preferences to find matchings which are…
In their seminal work on the Stable Marriage Problem (SM), Gale and Shapley introduced a generalization of SM referred to as the Stable Roommates Problem (SR). An instance of SR consists of a set of $2n$ agents, and each agent has…
Online dating platforms have fundamentally transformed the formation of romantic relationships, with millions of users worldwide relying on algorithmic matching systems to find compatible partners. However, current recommendation systems in…
Recommender systems leverage extensive user interaction data to model preferences; however, directly modeling these data may introduce biases that disproportionately favor popular items. In this paper, we demonstrate that popularity bias…
Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who need to be matched pairwise. It can be applied to many real-world scenarios and explain many social phenomena. In this article, we study the effect of competition on…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…
Recommender systems often suffer from popularity bias, where popular items are overly recommended while sacrificing unpopular items. Existing researches generally focus on ensuring the number of recommendations exposure of each item is…
We consider the problem of computing a matching in a bipartite graph in the presence of one-sided preferences. There are several well studied notions of optimality which include pareto optimality, rank maximality, fairness and popularity.…
In the Nonnegative Matrix Factorization (NMF) problem we are given an $n \times m$ nonnegative matrix $M$ and an integer $r > 0$. Our goal is to express $M$ as $A W$ where $A$ and $W$ are nonnegative matrices of size $n \times r$ and $r…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
We consider an assignment problem that has aspects of fair division as well as social choice. In particular, we investigate the problem of assigning a small subset from a set of indivisible items to multiple players so that the chosen…
Consider the model where we can access a parity function through random uniform labeled examples in the presence of random classification noise. In this paper, we show that approximating the number of relevant variables in the parity…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
We consider the task of collaborative preference completion: given a pool of items, a pool of users and a partially observed item-user rating matrix, the goal is to recover the \emph{personalized ranking} of each user over all of the items.…
The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with…
The stable marriage problem, as addressed by Gale and Shapely [1] consists of providing a bipartite matching between n " boys " and n " girls "-each of whom have a totally ordered preference list over the other set-such that there exists no…
Given a set of pairwise comparisons, the classical ranking problem computes a single ranking that best represents the preferences of all users. In this paper, we study the problem of inferring individual preferences, arising in the context…
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…