Related papers: Computing and Testing Pareto Optimal Committees
We introduce a single-winner perspective on voting on matchings, in which voters have preferences over possible matchings in a graph, and the goal is to select a single collectively desirable matching. Unlike in classical matching problems,…
This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents' payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choice functions…
When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to identify outcomes that are Pareto optimal and to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process. We consider participation notions as formalized by…
We formalize the concept of Pareto Adaptive Robust Optimality (PARO) for linear Adaptive Robust Optimization (ARO) problems. A worst-case optimal solution pair of here-and-now decisions and wait-and-see decisions is PARO if it cannot be…
We consider the problem of optimal risk sharing in a pool of cooperative agents. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of the certainty equivalents and risk premia associated with the Pareto optimal risk sharing contract as the pool expands.…
Multi-task learning, which optimizes performance across multiple tasks, is inherently a multi-objective optimization problem. Various algorithms are developed to provide discrete trade-off solutions on the Pareto front. Recently, continuous…
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the…
We study how to infer new choices from prior choices using the framework of choice functions, a unifying mathematical framework for decision-making based on sets of preference orders. In particular, we define the natural (most conservative)…
We study the problem of designing voting rules that take as input the ordinal preferences of $n$ agents over a set of $m$ alternatives and output a single alternative, aiming to optimize the overall happiness of the agents. The input to the…
A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn…
Assume $k$ candidates need to be selected. The candidates appear over time. Each time one appears, it must be immediately selected or rejected -- a decision that is made by a group of individuals through voting. Assume the voters use…
We consider a setting in which a group of agents share resources that must be allocated among them in each discrete time period. Agents have time-varying demands and derive constant marginal utility from each unit of resource received up to…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
We consider the problem of computing a matching in a bipartite graph in the presence of one-sided preferences. There are several well studied notions of optimality which include pareto optimality, rank maximality, fairness and popularity.…
This work focuses on equilibrium selection in no-conflict multi-agent games, where we specifically study the problem of selecting a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium among several existing equilibria. It has been shown that many…
We study matching problems in which agents form one side of a bipartite graph and have preferences over objects on the other side. A central solution concept in this setting is popularity: a matching is popular if it is a (weak) Condorcet…
In the United States and elsewhere, risk assessment algorithms are being used to help inform criminal justice decision-makers. A common intent is to forecast an offender's ``future dangerousness.'' Such algorithms have been correctly…
We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly…
Wagering mechanisms are one-shot betting mechanisms that elicit agents' predictions of an event. For deterministic wagering mechanisms, an existing impossibility result has shown incompatibility of some desirable theoretical properties. In…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…