Related papers: Maximizing Efficiency in Dynamic Matching Markets
In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the…
A two-sided matching system is considered, where servers are assumed to arrive at a fixed rate, while the arrival rate of customers is modulated via a price-control mechanism. We analyse a loss model, wherein customers who are not served…
A team of anonymous mobile agents represented by points freely moving in the plane have to gather at a single point and stop. Agents start at different points of the plane and at possibly different times chosen by the adversary. They are…
For online resource allocation problems, we propose a new demand arrival model where the sequence of arrivals contains both an adversarial component and a stochastic one. Our model requires no demand forecasting; however, due to the…
We address the problem of planning collision-free paths for multiple agents using optimization methods known as proximal algorithms. Recently this approach was explored in Bento et al. 2013, which demonstrated its ease of parallelization…
We study truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in online bipartite matching. In our (multi-parameter) setting, every buyer is associated with a (possibly private) desired set of items, and has a private value for being assigned an…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
In the problem of online load balancing on uniformly related machines with bounded migration, jobs arrive online one after another and have to be immediately placed on one of a given set of machines without knowledge about jobs that may…
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…
Two identical anonymous mobile agents have to meet at a node of the infinite oriented grid whose nodes are unlabeled. This problem is known as rendezvous. The agents execute the same deterministic algorithm. Time is divided into rounds, and…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
In recent years, significant advances have been made in the design and analysis of fully dynamic maximal matching algorithms. However, these theoretical results have received very little attention from the practical perspective. Few of the…
We study the minimum-cost metric perfect matching problem under online i.i.d arrivals. We are given a fixed metric with a server at each of the points, and then requests arrive online, each drawn independently from a known probability…
We study an online version of the max-min fair allocation problem for indivisible items. In this problem, items arrive one by one, and each item must be allocated irrevocably on arrival to one of $n$ agents, who have additive valuations for…
We study the problem of online learning in two-sided non-stationary matching markets, where the objective is to converge to a stable match. In particular, we consider the setting where one side of the market, the arms, has fixed known set…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
This paper explores a novel extension of dynamic matching theory by analyzing a three-way matching problem involving agents from three distinct populations, each with two possible types. Unlike traditional static or two-way dynamic models,…
Information exchange is a crucial component of many real-world multi-agent systems. However, the communication between the agents involves two major challenges: the limited bandwidth, and the shared communication medium between the agents,…
Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a "one-sided" manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiary. Our work investigates "two-sided" manipulation of the…