Related papers: Efficient Black-Box Reductions for Separable Cost …
In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
In the one-dimensional facility assignment problem, m facilities and n agents are positioned along the real line. Each agent will be assigned to a single facility to receive service. Each facility incurs a building cost, which is shared…
In this work, we study stochastic non-cooperative games, where only noisy black-box function evaluations are available to estimate the cost function for each player. Since each player's cost function depends on both its own decision…
Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants --network operators and/or services-- is considered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for…
High fidelity simulation of large-sized complex networks can be realized on a distributed computing platform that leverages the combined resources of multiple processors or machines. In a discrete event driven simulation, the assignment of…
This paper aims to design a distributed coordination algorithm for solving a multi-agent decision problem with a hierarchical structure. The primary goal is to search the Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game such that each player has…
We investigate asynchronous distributed algorithms with delayed information for seeking generalized Nash equilibrium over multi-agent networks. The considered game model has all players' local decisions coupled with a shared affine…
The airport game is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to the so-called assignment setting, that is, for multiple facilities and agents, each agent…
The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propose a framework for designing distributed algorithms with a…
We propose a generic strategic network resource sharing game between a set of players representing operators. The players negotiate which sets of players share given resources, serving users with varying sensitivity to interference. We…
In this paper, we aim to design a distributed approximate algorithm for seeking Nash equilibria of an aggregative game. Due to the local set constraints of each player, projectionbased algorithms have been widely employed for solving such…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
Game theory has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling a large range of multi-agent scenarios. Many algorithmic solutions require discrete, finite games with payoffs that have a closed-form specification. In contrast, many real-world…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous…
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…
In many resource allocation problems, a centralized controller needs to award some resource to a user selected from a collection of distributed users with the goal of maximizing the utility the user would receive from the resource. This can…
Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…
The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing…