Related papers: Superrational types
This paper shows that, for symmetric games in normal form, strategy profiles that satisfy Hofstadter's Superrationality criterion also satisfy both of Halpern's and Pass's criteria under Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality:…
In experimental applications of bounded-reasoning models, behavior is often summarized by distributions of "levels". We argue that such summaries conflate two conceptually distinct dimensions: a player's type, capturing beliefs about what…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
The rational choice theory is based on this idea that people rationally pursue goals for increasing their personal interests. In most conditions, the behavior of an actor is not independent of the person and others' behavior. Here, we…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
Game comonads offer a categorical view of a number of model-comparison games central to model theory, such as pebble and Ehrenfeucht-Fra\"iss\'e games. Remarkably, the categories of coalgebras for these comonads capture preservation of…
We study the behavioral implications of Rationality and Common Strong Belief in Rationality (RCSBR) with contextual assumptions allowing players to entertain misaligned beliefs, i.e., players can hold beliefs concerning their opponents'…
Hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 1999) play a central role for the epistemic analysis of solution concepts in sequential games. They are practically modelled by type structures, which allow the analyst to…
We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of…
We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of "cautious rationality and…
We provide a compositional coalgebraic semantics for strategic games. In our framework, like in the semantics of functional programming languages, coalgebras represent the observable behaviour of systems derived from the behaviour of the…
This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…
Hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi 1999) play a central role for the epistemic analysis of solution concepts in sequential games. They are modelled by type structures, which allow the analyst to represent the…
This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations of beliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis of different structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities. Special attention…
The aim of this of this paper is to study infinite games and to prove formally some properties in this framework. As a consequence we show that the behavior (the madness) of people which leads to speculative crashes or escalation can be…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
We propose a new interpretation of the strange phenomena that some authors have observed about the Wald game. This interpretation is possible thanks to the new language of \emph{loadings} that Morrison and the author have introduced in a…
We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents' cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory…
Behavioral experiments on the Ultimatum Game have shown that we human beings have remarkable preference in fair play, contradicting the predictions by the game theory. Most of the existing models seeking for explanations, however, strictly…
We present a game semantics for intuitionistic type theory. Specifically, we propose categories with families of a new variant of games and strategies for both extensional and intensional variants of the type theory with dependent function,…