Related papers: Proportional Representation in Approval-based Comm…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of members of the community. Different rules have been used to aggregate participants' votes. Past research has studied the trade-off…
We consider the problem of committee selection from a fixed set of candidates where each candidate has multiple quantifiable attributes. To select the best possible committee, instead of voting for a candidate, a voter is allowed to approve…
In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In particular, each voter can approve multiple parties and each…
We examine the following voting situation. A committee of $k$ people is to be formed from a pool of n candidates. The voters selecting the committee will submit a list of $j$ candidates that they would prefer to be on the committee. We…
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of…
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explore which (if any) fairness guarantees can be provided under…
Citizen-focused democratic processes where participants deliberate on alternatives and then vote to make the final decision are increasingly popular today. While the computational social choice literature has extensively investigated voting…
This paper proposes normative criteria for voting rules under uncertainty about individual preferences. The criteria emphasize the importance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized…
We contribute to the programme of lifting proportionality axioms from the multi-winner voting setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory budgeting and test them on known…
Approval-based committee (ABC) voting rules elect a fixed size subset of the candidates, a so-called committee, based on the voters' approval ballots over the candidates. While these rules have recently attracted significant attention,…
Transitive proxy voting (or "liquid democracy") is a novel form of collective decision making, often framed as an attractive hybrid of direct and representative democracy. Although the ideas behind liquid democracy have garnered widespread…
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain…
This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules and provide an axiomatic…
Elections are the central institution of democratic processes, and often the elected body -- in either public or private governance -- is a committee of individuals. To ensure the legitimacy of elected bodies, the electoral processes should…
In an approval-based committee election, the goal is to select a committee consisting of $k$ out of $m$ candidates, based on $n$ voters who each approve an arbitrary number of the candidates. The core of such an election consists of all…
Social choice theory is the study of preference aggregation across a population, used both in mechanism design for human agents and in the democratic alignment of language models. In this study, we propose the representative social choice…
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process for allocating funds to projects based on the votes of community members. PB outcomes are commonly evaluated for how they reflect voters preferences (e.g., social welfare) and the extent…
This paper proposes a voting process in which voters allocate fractional votes to their expected utility in different domains: over proposals, other participants, and sets containing proposals and participants. This approach allows for a…
Multi-winner voting plays a crucial role in selecting representative committees based on voter preferences. Previous research has predominantly focused on single-stage voting rules, which are susceptible to manipulation during preference…
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…