Related papers: Hyper-rational choice theory
We introduce a framework within evolutionary game theory for studying the distinction between objective and subjective rationality and apply it to the evolution of cooperation on 3-regular random graphs. In our simulations, agents evolve…
In this paper we introduce a qualitative decision and game theory based on belief (B) and desire (D) rules. We show that a group of agents acts as if it is maximizing achieved joint goals.
Two traditional paradigms are often used to describe the behavior of agents in multi-agent complex systems. In the first one, agents are considered to be fully rational and systems are seen as multi-player games. In the second one, agents…
This paper introduces a novel framework for modeling interacting humans in a multi-stage game. This "iterated semi network-form game" framework has the following desirable characteristics: (1) Bounded rational players, (2) strategic players…
Active inference is an ambitious theory that treats perception, inference and action selection of autonomous agents under the heading of a single principle. It suggests biologically plausible explanations for many cognitive phenomena,…
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
The standard rational choice model describes individuals as making choices by selecting the best option from a menu. A wealth of evidence instead suggests that individuals often filter menus into smaller sets - consideration sets - from…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…
How should my own decisions affect my beliefs about the outcomes I expect to achieve? If taking a certain action makes me view myself as a certain type of person, it might affect how I think others view me, and how I view others who are…
Methods for learning optimal policies in autonomous agents often assume that the way the domain is conceptualised---its possible states and actions and their causal structure---is known in advance and does not change during learning. This…
In quantum game theory, one of the most intriguing and important questions is, "Is it possible to get quantum advantages without any modification of the classical game?" The answer to this question so far has largely been negative. So far,…
When users stand to gain from certain predictions, they are prone to act strategically to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. Whereas most works on strategic classification consider user actions that manifest as feature modifications, we…
When human cognition is modeled in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, there is a pervasive idea that humans employ mental representations in order to navigate the world and make predictions about outcomes of future actions. By understanding…
Reinforcement learning systems will to a greater and greater extent make decisions that significantly impact the well-being of humans, and it is therefore essential that these systems make decisions that conform to our expectations of…
Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, is otherwise the standard stag-hunt dilemma (when individuals…
A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the…
We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter's concept of \emph{superrationality}. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…