Related papers: Mean-potential law in evolutionary games

Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…

As an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory and has attracted growing interest. An ESS can be either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy. Even…

In this paper we study the minority game in the presence of evolution. In particular, we examine the behavior in games in which the dimension of the strategy space, m, is the same for all agents and fixed for all time. We find that for all…

Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…

We model evolution according to an asymmetric game as occurring in multiple finite populations, one for each role in the game, and study the effect of subjecting individuals to stochastic strategy mutations. We show that, when these…

The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provides a new framework to understand the selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a simple but fundamental law of evolutionary dynamics, which we call {\sigma} law,…

This paper investigates the convergence time of log-linear learning to an $\epsilon$-efficient Nash equilibrium in potential games, where an efficient Nash equilibrium is defined as the maximizer of the potential function. Previous…

An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative (``mutant'') strategies. Unlike Nash equilibria, ESS do not always exist in finite games. In this paper we address the…

The recent theory of sequential games and selection functions by Mar- tin Escardo and Paulo Oliva is extended to games in which players move simultaneously. The Nash existence theorem for mixed-strategy equilibria of finite games is…

Stochastic models, based on random processes, may lead to power law distributions, which provide long range correlations. The observation of power law behavior and the presence of long range correlations in biological systems has been…

Mean field games (MFGs) offer a powerful framework for modeling large-scale multi-agent systems. This paper addresses MFGs formulated in continuous time with discrete state spaces, where agents' dynamics are governed by continuous-time…

We use system-theoretic passivity methods to study evolutionary Nash equilibria learning in large populations of agents engaged in strategic, non-cooperative interactions. The agents follow learning rules (rules for short) that capture…

We study potential games on unimodular random graphs of bounded degree, where players interact through the underlying network. Using the unimodular measure, we define a well-posed global potential that captures both finite- and…

Motivated by the recent applications of game-theoretical learning techniques to the design of distributed control systems, we study a class of control problems that can be formulated as potential games with continuous action sets, and we…

Commuters looking for the shortest path to their destinations, the security of networked computers, hedge funds trading on the same stocks, governments and populations acting to mitigate an epidemic, or employers and employees agreeing on a…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations. Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new type of…

We introduce novel multi-agent interaction models of entropic spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary undisclosed games and their quasi-static limits. These evolutions vastly generalize first and second order dynamics. Besides the…

We revisit in this paper the relation between evolution of species and the mathematical tool of evolutionary games, which has been used to model and predict it. We indicate known shortcoming of this model that restricts the capacity of…