Related papers: On a Generic Security Game Model
Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…
This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…
In the cybersecurity setting, defenders are often at the mercy of their detection technologies and subject to the information and experiences that individual analysts have. In order to give defenders an advantage, it is important to…
Deception plays critical roles in economics and technology, especially in emerging interactions in cyberspace. Holistic models of deception are needed in order to analyze interactions and to design mechanisms that improve them. Game theory…
Cyber-physical systems can be subject to sensor attacks, e.g., sensor spoofing, leading to unsafe behaviors. This paper addresses this problem in the context of linear systems when an omniscient attacker can spoof several system sensors at…
Abuse of zero-permission sensors on-board mobile and wearable devices to infer users' personal context and information is a well-known privacy threat that has received significant attention. Efforts towards protection mechanisms that…
Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…
In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks…
We initiate the analysis of the response of computer owners to various offers of defence systems against a cyber-hacker (for instance, a botnet attack), as a stochastic game of a large number of interacting agents. We introduce a simple…
Security games model the confrontation between a defender protecting a set of targets and an attacker who tries to capture them. A variant of these games assumes security interdependence between targets, facilitating contagion of an attack.…
In this paper, we establish a zero-sum, hybrid state stochastic game model for designing defense policies for cyber-physical systems against different types of attacks. With the increasingly integrated properties of cyber-physical systems…
In settings with incomplete information, players can find it difficult to coordinate to find states with good social welfare. For example, in financial settings, if a collection of financial firms have limited information about each other's…
We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a…
We consider the probabilistic planning problem for a defender (P1) who can jointly query the sensors and take control actions to reach a set of goal states while being aware of possible sensor attacks by an adversary (P2) who has perfect…
Securing the physical components of a city's interdependent critical infrastructure (ICI) such as power, natural gas, and water systems is a challenging task due to their interdependence and a large number of involved sensors. In this…
We consider the probabilistic planning problem where the agent (called Player 1, or P1) can jointly plan the control actions and sensor queries in a sensor network and an attacker (called player 2, or P2) can carry out attacks on the…
We lay out a model of games with imperfect information that features explicit communication actions, by which the entire observation history of a player is revealed to another player. Such full-information protocols are common in…
A game-theoretic model for analysing the effects of privacy on strategic communication between agents is devised. In the model, a sender wishes to provide an accurate measurement of the state to a receiver while also protecting its private…