Related papers: A Zero-stealthy Attack for Sampled-data Control Sy…
The extensive use of distributed vehicle platoon controllers has resulted in several benefits for transportation systems, such as increased traffic flow, fuel efficiency, and decreased pollution. The rising reliance on interconnected…
Anomaly detection plays a vital role in the security and safety of cyber-physical control systems, and accurately distinguishing between different anomaly types is crucial for system recovery and mitigation. This study proposes a dual…
We address the problem of estimating the state of a differentially flat system from measurements that may be corrupted by an adversarial attack. In cyber-physical systems, malicious attacks can directly compromise the system's sensors or…
The state estimation of continuous-time nonlinear systems in which a subset of sensor outputs can be maliciously controlled through injecting a potentially unbounded additive signal is considered in this paper. Analogous to our earlier work…
As cyber-physical systems (CPSs) become more dependent on data and communication networks, their vulnerability to false data injection (FDI) attacks has raised significant concerns. Among these, stealthy attacks, those that evade…
Cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructures, such as water treatment facilities, represent significant threats to public health, safety, and the environment. This paper introduces a systematic approach for modeling and assessing covert…
Digital control has become increasingly prevalent in modern systems, making continuous-time plants controlled by discrete-time (digital) controllers ubiquitous and crucial across industries, including aerospace, automotive, and…
Machine learning models have been shown to leak information violating the privacy of their training set. We focus on membership inference attacks on machine learning models which aim to determine whether a data point was used to train the…
In this paper, we consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation, that is to reliably estimate the true system states despite two classes of attacks: (i) attacks on the switching mechanisms and (ii) false data injection attacks…
This article considers the design and analysis of multiple moving target defenses for recognizing and isolating attacks on cyber-physical systems. We consider attackers who perform integrity attacks on a set of sensors and actuators in a…
Recent years have witnessed a rise in the frequency and intensity of cyberattacks targeted at critical infrastructure systems. This study designs a versatile, data-driven cyberattack detection platform for infrastructure systems…
This paper examines the properties of output-redundant systems, that is, systems possessing a larger number of outputs than inputs, through the lenses of the geometric approach of Wonham et al. We begin by formulating a simple output…
Sensor systems are extremely popular today and vulnerable to sensor data attacks. Due to possible devastating consequences, counteracting sensor data attacks is an extremely important topic, which has not seen sufficient study. This paper…
This paper analyzes stealthy attacks, particularly the zero-dynamics attack (ZDA) in networked control systems. ZDA hides the attack signal in the null-space of the state-space representation of the control system and hence it cannot be…
Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network…
We address the problem of state estimation, attack isolation, and control of discrete-time linear time-invariant systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator and sensor false data injection attacks. Using a bank of unknown input…
This paper quantifies the security of uncertain interconnected systems under stealthy data injection attacks. In particular, we consider a large-scale system composed of a certain subsystem interconnected with an uncertain subsystem, where…
SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research focuses on network anomaly detection based on meta--data (message sizes, timing, command sequence), or on the…
We study the problem of detecting an attack on a stochastic cyber-physical system. We aim to treat the problem in its most general form. We start by introducing the notion of asymptotically detectable attacks, as those attacks introducing…
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) rely on insecure protocols and devices to monitor and operate critical infrastructure. Prior work has demonstrated that powerful attackers with detailed system knowledge can manipulate exchanged sensor data…