Related papers: A Zero-stealthy Attack for Sampled-data Control Sy…

Consider a stochastic process being controlled across a communication channel. The control signal that is transmitted across the control channel can be replaced by a malicious attacker. The controller is allowed to implement any arbitrary…

Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can lead to significant physical damage. While offline safety and security assessments can provide insight into vulnerable system components, they may not account for stealthy attacks designed to…

This paper presents a detection algorithm for sensor attacks and a resilient state estimation scheme for a class of uniformly observable nonlinear systems. An adversary is supposed to corrupt a subset of sensors with the possibly unbounded…

We study the stability properties of a control system composed of a dynamical plant and a feedback controller, the latter generating control signals that can be compromised by a malicious attacker. We consider two classes of feedback…

We consider the problem of controller design for linear time-invariant cyber-physical systems (CPSs) controlled via networks. Specifically, we adopt the set-up that a controller has already been designed to stabilize the plant. However, the…

Stealthy false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs) introduce erroneous measurement information to on-board sensors with the purpose to degrade system performance. An intelligent attacker is able to leverage knowledge of…

Attacks, including the manipulation of sensor readings and the modification of actuator commands, pose a significant challenge to the security and privacy of automated systems. This paper considers discrete event systems that can be modeled…

This work presents a rigorous analysis of the adverse effects of cyber-physical attacks on discrete-time distributed multi-agent systems, and propose a mitigation approach for attacks on sensors and actuators. First, we show how an attack…

A class of data integrity attack, known as false data injection (FDI) attack, has been studied with a considerable amount of work. It has shown that with perfect knowledge of the system model and the capability to manipulate a certain…

The advantages of using communication networks to interconnect controllers and physical plants motivate the increasing number of Networked Control Systems, in industrial and critical infrastructure facilities. However, this integration also…

In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the…

This paper considers a constrained discrete-time linear system subject to actuation attacks. The attacks are modelled as false data injections to the system, such that the total input (control input plus injection) satisfies hard input…

This paper studies the attack detection problem in a data-driven and model-free setting, for deterministic systems with linear and time-invariant dynamics. Differently from existing studies that leverage knowledge of the system dynamics to…

In this article, we address the problem of risk assessment of stealthy attacks on uncertain control systems. Considering data injection attacks that aim at maximizing impact while remaining undetected, we use the recently proposed…

Although adverse effects of attacks have been acknowledged in many cyber-physical systems, there is no system-theoretic comprehension of how a compromised agent can leverage communication capabilities to maximize the damage in distributed…

This paper considers the problem of detector tuning against false data injection attacks. In particular, we consider an adversary injecting false sensor data to maximize the state deviation of the plant, referred to as impact, whilst being…

The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…

This draft addresses issues of detecting stealthy integrity cyber-attacks on automatic control systems in the unified control and detection framework. A general form of integrity cyber-attacks that cannot be detected using the…

This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…

Cyber-physical systems can be subject to sensor attacks, e.g., sensor spoofing, leading to unsafe behaviors. This paper addresses this problem in the context of linear systems when an omniscient attacker can spoof several system sensors at…