Related papers: From fixation probabilities to d-player games: an …
Understanding how stochastic and non-linear deterministic processes interact is a major challenge in population dynamics theory. After a short review, we introduce a stochastic individual-centered particle model to describe the evolution in…
We study the evolution of preferences in multi-population settings that allow matches across distinct populations. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and…
The coevolutionary dynamics in finite populations currently is investigated in a wide range of disciplines, as chemical catalysis, biological evolution, social and economic systems. The dynamics of those systems can be formulated within the…
We consider the problem of representing collective behavior of large populations and predicting the evolution of a population distribution over a discrete state space. A discrete time mean field game (MFG) is motivated as an interpretable…
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…
The appropriate description of fluctuations within the framework of evolutionary game theory is a fundamental unsolved problem in the case of finite populations. The Moran process recently introduced into this context [Nowak et al., Nature…
Players of coevolutionary games may update not only their strategies but also their networks of interaction. Based on interpreting the payoff of players as fitness, dynamic landscape models are proposed. The modeling procedure is carried…
In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy $A$ performs better than strategy $B$, strategy $A$ will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single…
Reputation plays a crucial role in social interactions by affecting the fitness of individuals during an evolutionary process. Previous works have extensively studied the result of imitation dynamics without focusing on potential irrational…
The replicator-mutator equation is a model for populations of individuals carrying different traits, with a fitness function mediating their ability to replicate, and a stochastic model for mutation. We derive analytical solutions for the…
Coevolving and competing species or game-theoretic strategies exhibit rich and complex dynamics for which a general theoretical framework based on finite populations is still lacking. Recently, an explicit mean-field description in the form…
We study the probability of fixation in a stochastic two-species competition model. By identifying a naturally occurring fast timescale, we derive an approximation to the associated backward Kolmogorov equation that allows us to obtain an…
Existing theoretical models of evolution focus on the relative fitness advantages of different mutants in a population while the dynamic behavior of the population size is mostly left unconsidered. We here present a generic stochastic model…
Evolutionary graph theory studies the evolutionary dynamics in a population structure given as a connected graph. Each node of the graph represents an individual of the population, and edges determine how offspring are placed. We consider…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
We study fixation probabilities and times as a consequence of neutral genetic drift in subdivided populations, motivated by a model of the cultural evolutionary process of language change that is described by the same mathematics as the…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite populations of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical results from game theory,…
In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…
Many studies have analyzed how variability in reproductive success affects fitness. However, each study tends to focus on a particular problem, leaving unclear the overall structure of variability in populations. This fractured conceptual…