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We consider the problem of learning stable matchings with unknown preferences in a decentralized and uncoordinated manner, where "decentralized" means that players make decisions individually without the influence of a central platform, and…
We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because…
Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…
A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that…
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved many recent successes, but our understanding of its strengths and limitations is hampered by the lack of rich environments in which we can fully characterize optimal behavior, and correspondingly…
We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur…
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
We consider repeated games where the players behave according to cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We show that, when the players have calibrated strategies and behave according to CPT, the natural analog of the notion of correlated…
$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…
We study multi-player turn-based games played on (potentially infinite) directed graphs. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We…
Motivated by the question of how a principal can maximize its utility in repeated interactions with a learning agent, we study repeated games between an principal and an agent employing a mean-based learning algorithm. Prior work has shown…
In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well…
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…
The paper studies the highly prototypical Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm, as well as a broad class of learning processes based on best-response dynamics, that we refer to as FP-type algorithms. A well-known shortcoming of FP is that, while…