Related papers: A Game of Random Variables

This paper considers a time-varying game with $N$ players. Every time slot, players observe their own random events and then take a control action. The events and control actions affect the individual utilities earned by each player. The…

We consider a game in which players are the vertices of a directed graph. Initially, Nature chooses one player according to some fixed distribution and gives her a buck, which represents the request to perform a chore. After completing the…

In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…

We present a new tool for the study of multiplayer stochastic games, namely the modified game, which is a normal-form game that depends on the discount factor, the initial state, and for every player a partition of the set of states and a…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

We consider a general class of round-robin tournament models of equally strong players. In these models, each of the $n$ players competes against every other player exactly once. For each match between two players, the outcome is a value…

We consider 2-players, 2-values minimization games where the players' costs take on two values, $a,b$, $a<b$. The players play mixed strategies and their costs are evaluated by unimodal valuations. This broad class of valuations includes…

An unknown positive number of items arrive at independent uniformly distributed times in the interval [0,1] to a selector, whose task is to pick online the last one. We show that under the assumption of an adversary determining the number…

In a classical chess round-robin tournament, each of $n$ players wins, draws, or loses a game against each of the other $n-1$ players. A win rewards a player with 1 points, a draw with 1/2 point, and a loss with 0 points. We are interested…

For a zero-sum stochastic game which does not satisfy the Isaacs condition, we provide a value function representation for an Isaacs-type equation whose Hamiltonian lies in between the lower and upper Hamiltonians, as a convex combination…

We consider a large community of individuals who mix strongly and meet in pairs to bet on a coin toss. We investigate the asset distribution of the players involved in this zero-sum repeated game. Our main result is that the asset…

We calculate the standard deviation of (N1-N0), the difference of the number of agents choosing between the two alternatives of the minority game. Our approach is based on two approximations: we use the whole set of possible strategies,…

We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of…

We consider a limit theorem for the distribution of a r.v. $Y_n:=argmax {\{X_i, i= 1,..., n\}},$ where $X_i'$s are independent continuous non-negative random variables. The r.v.'s $\{X_i, i=1,..., n\}$, may be interpreted as the gains of…

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has more information on the game than his opponent. We show how to construct numerical schemes for the value function of this game, which is given…

In this work we consider an agent based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying to learn the…

This paper considers a two-person zero-sum continuous-time Markov pure jump game in Borel state and action spaces over a fixed finite horizon. The main assumption on the model is the existence of a drift function, which bounds the reward…

We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an $\ep$-equilibrium for all $\varepsilon>0$.

We consider zero-sum repeated games in which the players are restricted to strategies that require only a limited amount of randomness. Let $v_n$ be the max-min value of the $n$ stage game; previous works have characterized…

We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for…