Related papers: Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Just…
In this paper we extend the principle of proportional representation to rankings. We consider the setting where alternatives need to be ranked based on approval preferences. In this setting, proportional representation requires that…
This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…
We show how voting may be viewed naturally from an algebraic perspective by viewing voting profiles as elements of certain well-studied $\mathbb{Q}S_n$-modules. By using only a handful of simple combinatorial objects (e.g., tabloids) and…
Proportional representation plays a crucial role in electoral systems. In ordinal elections, where voters rank candidates based on their preferences, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) is the most widely used proportional voting method. STV…
We introduce a general framework for exploring the problem of selecting a committee of representatives with the aim of studying a networked voting rule based on a decentralized large-scale platform, which can assure a strong accountability…
Committee-selection problems arise in many contexts and applications, and there has been increasing interest within the social choice research community on identifying which properties are satisfied by different multi-winner voting rules.…
We study the approval-based multi-winner election problem where $n$ voters jointly decide a committee of $k$ winners from $m$ candidates. We focus on the axiom \emph{average justified representation} (AJR) proposed by Fernandez, Elkind,…
When a collective decision maker presents a menu of uncertain prospects to her group members, each member's choice depends on their predictions about payoff-relevant states. In reality, however, these members hold different predictions;…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are to be selected. In particular we focus on the axiomatic property called extended…
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existing criteria for evaluating the representativeness of…
Online discussion platforms are a vital part of the public discourse in a deliberative democracy. However, how to interpret the outcomes of the discussions on these platforms is often unclear. In this paper, we propose a novel and…
In multiwinner approval voting, forming a committee that proportionally represents voters' approval ballots is an essential task. The notion of justified representation (JR) demands that any large "cohesive" group of voters should be…
We initiate the work towards a comprehensive picture of the smoothed satisfaction of voting axioms, to provide a finer and more realistic foundation for comparing voting rules. We adopt the smoothed social choice framework, where an…
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters' preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters with cohesive preferences should be adequately represented…
We investigate the complexity of several manipulation and control problems under numerous prevalent approval-based multiwinner voting rules. Particularly, the rules we study include approval voting (AV), satisfaction approval voting (SAV),…
We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their Nominated Proof-of-Stake mechanism and contain around one…
Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking multiple proposals. Yet, while a vote on a single proposal has the status quo (Reality) as a default, Reality has been forsaken during this generalization. Here, we propose…
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common solution to increase participation is to allow voters use a proxy, that is, transfer…