Related papers: Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Just…
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is…
Social choice has become a foundational component of modern machine learning systems. From auctions and resource allocation to the alignment of large generative models, machine learning pipelines increasingly aggregate heterogeneous…
In this paper, we propose a family of approval voting-schemes for electing committees based on the preferences of voters. In our schemes, we calculate the vector of distances of the possible committees from each of the ballots and, for a…
We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and -- in addition to a global budget limit, there are several…
We consider a committee voting setting in which each voter approves of a subset of candidates and based on the approvals, a target number of candidates are selected. Aziz et al. (2015) proposed two representation axioms called justified…
We introduces a general linear framework that unifies the study of multi-winner voting rules and proportionality axioms, demonstrating that many prominent multi-winner voting rules-including Thiele methods, their sequential variants, and…
A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been…
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…
Consider an election where N seats are distributed among parties with proportions p_1,...,p_m of the votes. We study, for the common divisor and quota methods, the asymptotic distribution, and in particular the mean, of the seat excess of a…
We study approval-based committee voting from a novel perspective. While extant work largely centers around proportional representation of the voters, we shift our focus to the candidates while preserving proportionality. Intuitively,…
We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that…
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where…
We present a model of truthful elicitation which generalizes and extends mechanisms, scoring rules, and a number of related settings that do not qualify as one or the other. Our main result is a characterization theorem, yielding…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
In an approval-based committee election, the task is to select a committee of up to $k$ candidates from a set of $m$ candidates based on the preferences of $n$ voters, each of whom approves a subset of the candidates. A central open…
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…
Even though proportional representation is a fundamental goal in multiwinner voting and a plethora of proportionality notions has been introduced, the normative justifications for choosing one notion over another remain poorly understood.…
We use the United States Supreme Court as an illuminative context in which to discuss three different spatial voting preference models: an instance of the widely used single-peaked preferences, and two models that are more novel in which…
Approval-based committee selection is a model of significant interest in social choice theory. In this model, we have a set of voters $\mathcal{V}$, a set of candidates $\mathcal{C}$, and each voter has a set $A_v \subset \mathcal{C}$ of…
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on…