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We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior work showed that there exists an allocation that satisfies…
We introduce robust learning equilibrium. The idea of learning equilibrium is that learning algorithms in multi-agent systems should themselves be in equilibrium rather than only lead to equilibrium. That is, learning equilibrium is immune…
We consider a private variant of the classical allocation problem: given k goods and n agents with individual, private valuation functions over bundles of goods, how can we partition the goods amongst the agents to maximize social welfare?…
Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in multiagent systems, and envy-freeness is among the most compelling fairness concepts. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of any other…
This paper studies the optimal resource allocation problem within a multi-agent network composed of both autonomous agents and humans. The main challenge lies in the globally coupled constraints that link the decisions of autonomous agents…
Multi-agent systems powered by large language models exhibit strong capabilities in collaborative problem-solving. However, these systems suffer from substantial knowledge redundancy. Agents duplicate efforts in retrieval and reasoning…
We study the problem of computing a Maximal Independent Set (MIS) in distributed networks where each node is a rational agent whose payoff depends on whether it joins the MIS. Classical distributed algorithms assume that nodes follow the…
The network coloring game has been proposed in the literature of social sciences as a model for conflict-resolution circumstances. The players of the game are the vertices of a graph with $n$ vertices and maximum degree $\Delta$. The game…
In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…
Given an initial resource allocation, where some agents may envy others or where a different distribution of resources might lead to higher social welfare, our goal is to improve the allocation without reassigning resources. We consider a…
Conventional distributed approaches to coverage control may suffer from lack of convergence and poor performance, due to the fact that agents have limited information, especially in non-convex discrete environments. To address this issue,…
Deciding whether an agent possesses a model of its surrounding world is a fundamental step toward understanding its capabilities and limitations. In [10], it was shown that, within a particular framework, every almost optimal and general…
How can non-communicating agents learn to share congested resources efficiently? This is a challenging task when the agents can access the same resource simultaneously (in contrast to multi-agent multi-armed bandit problems) and the…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that…
In its simplest form the well known consensus problem for a networked family of autonomous agents is to devise a set of protocols or update rules, one for each agent, which can enable all of the agents to adjust or tune their "agreement…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We consider a multi-agent reinforcement learning problem where each agent seeks to maximize a shared reward while interacting with other agents, and they may or may not be able to communicate. Typically the agents do not have access to…
Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partial information setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents that are "truthful". However, in general noncooperative games agents may consider sending…
We study a setting where a group of agents, each receiving partially informative private signals, seek to collaboratively learn the true underlying state of the world (from a finite set of hypotheses) that generates their joint observation…
We propose a distributed algorithm to compute an equilibrium in aggregate games where players communicate over a fixed undirected network. Our algorithm exploits correlated perturbation to obfuscate information shared over the network. We…