Related papers: The Price of Anarchy for Transportation Networks w…
In this work we propose a macroscopic model for studying routing on networks shared between human-driven and autonomous vehicles that captures the effects of autonomous vehicles forming platoons. We use this to study inefficiency due to…
In a traffic network, vehicles normally select their routes selfishly. Consequently, traffic networks normally operate at an equilibrium characterized by Wardrop conditions. However, it is well known that equilibria are inefficient in…
Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often…
As autonomous cars are becoming tangible technologies, road networks will soon be shared by human-driven and autonomous cars. However, humans normally act selfishly which may result in network inefficiencies. In this work, we study…
We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…
This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin-destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
Among the many functions a Smart City must support, transportation dominates in terms of resource consumption, strain on the environment, and frustration of its citizens. We study transportation networks under two different routing…
When traffic is routed through a network that is susceptible to congestion, the self-interested decisions made by individual users do not, in general, produce the optimal flow. This discrepancy is quantified by the so-called "price of…
When people pick routes to minimize their travel time, the total experienced delay, or social cost, may be significantly greater than if people followed routes assigned to them by a social planner. This effect is accentuated when human…
We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that…
Traffic congestion has large economic and social costs. The introduction of autonomous vehicles can potentially reduce this congestion by increasing road capacity via vehicle platooning and by creating an avenue for influencing people's…
It is known that connected and autonomous vehicles are capable of maintaining shorter headways and distances when they form platoons of vehicles. Thus, such technologies can result in increases in the capacities of traffic networks.…
Path selection by selfish agents has traditionally been studied by comparing social optima and equilibria in the Wardrop model, i.e., by investigating the Price of Anarchy in selfish routing. In this work, we refine and extend the…
We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…
Considering congestion games with uncertain delays, we compute the inefficiency introduced in network routing by risk-averse agents. At equilibrium, agents may select paths that do not minimize the expected latency so as to obtain lower…
When selfish users share a road network and minimize their individual travel costs, the equilibrium they reach can be worse than the socially optimal routing. Tolls are often used to mitigate this effect in traditional congestion games,…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
Route controlled autonomous vehicles could have a significant impact in reducing congestion in the future. Before applying multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms to route control, we can model the system using a congestion game to…