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We introduce a new class of games, called social contribution games (SCGs), where each player's individual cost is equal to the cost he induces on society because of his presence. Our results reveal that SCGs constitute useful abstractions…
The question of how people form their opinion has fascinated economists and sociologists for quite some time. In many of the models, a group of people in a social network, each holding a numerical opinion, arrive at a shared opinion through…
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous traffic network with multiple users classes which differ considerably in their path selection objective. In particular, we consider two classes of users: ones who seek to minimize social cost…
Social networks on the Internet have seen an enormous growth recently and play a crucial role in different aspects of today's life. They have facilitated information dissemination in ways that have been beneficial for their users but they…
This paper considers coverage games in which a group of agents are tasked with identifying the highest-value subset of resources; in this context, game-theoretic approaches are known to yield Nash equilibria within a factor of 2 of optimal.…
We consider the capacitated selfish replication (CSR) game with binary preferences, over general undirected networks. We first show that such games have an associated ordinary potential function, and hence always admit a pure-strategy Nash…
Selfish routing is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, with one of the principal applications being that of routing in road networks. Inspired by the emergence of routing technologies and autonomous driving, we revisit selfish…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…
Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…
In this paper, we introduce a conceptual framework that model human social networks as an undirected dot-product graph of independent individuals. Their relationships are only determined by a cost-benefit analysis, i.e. by maximizing an…
Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…
We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to "seed" the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a social network. The payoffs to the firms are the eventual number of…
We consider a class of jump games in which agents of different types occupy the nodes of a graph aiming to maximize the variety of types in their neighborhood. In particular, each agent derives a utility equal to the number of types…
Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility…
We introduce the Funding Game, in which $m$ identical resources are to be allocated among $n$ selfish agents. Each agent requests a number of resources $x_i$ and reports a valuation $\tilde{v}_i(x_i)$, which verifiably {\em lower}-bounds…
Let $G(V,E)$ be a directed graph with $n$ vertices and $m$ edges. The edges $E$ of $G$ are divided into two types: $E_F$ and $E_P$. Each edge of $E_F$ has a fixed price. The edges of $E_P$ are the priceable edges and their price is not…
We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…
Several autonomous energy management and peer-to-peer trading mechanisms for future energy markets have been recently proposed based on optimization and game theory. In this paper, we study the impact of trading prices on the outcome of…