Related papers: Multiagent Maximum Coverage Problems: The Trade-of…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
Consider an unobservable $M|G|1$ queue with preemptive-resume scheduling and two priority classes. Customers are strategic and may join the premium class for a fee. We analyze the resulting equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium stability, and…
In this paper, we consider dynamic multi-agent systems (MAS) for decentralized resource allocation. The MAS operates at a competitive equilibrium to ensure supply and demand are balanced. First, we investigate the MAS over a finite horizon.…
The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…
The reliability and security of a user in an interconnected system depends on all users' collective effort in security. Consequently, investments in security technologies by strategic users is typically modeled as a public good problem,…
Malicious softwares or malwares for short have become a major security threat. While originating in criminal behavior, their impact are also influenced by the decisions of legitimate end users. Getting agents in the Internet, and in…
Designing fair algorithmic decision systems requires balancing model performance with fairness toward affected individuals: More fairness might require sacrificing some performance and vice versa, yet the space of possible trade-offs is…
This paper proposes a bilevel transit network design problem considering supply side uncertainty. The upper level problem determines frequency settings to simultaneously maximize the efficiency and equity measures, which are defined by the…
Trade-offs between accuracy and efficiency pervade law, public health, and other non-computing domains, which have developed policies to guide how to balance the two in conditions of uncertainty. While computer science also commonly studies…
We study a signaling game between two firms competing to have their product chosen by a principal. The products have qualities drawn i.i.d. from a common prior. The principal aims to choose the better product, but the quality of a product…
We study graphs and two-player games in which rewards are assigned to states, and the goal of the players is to satisfy or dissatisfy certain property of the generated outcome, given as a mean payoff property. Since the notion of…
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best…
We consider the classical machine scheduling, where $n$ jobs need to be scheduled on $m$ machines, and where job $j$ scheduled on machine $i$ contributes $p_{i,j}\in \mathbb{R}$ to the load of machine $i$, with the goal of minimizing the…
We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as…
In a multi-objective game, each individual's payoff is a \emph{vector-valued} function of everyone's actions. Under such vectorial payoffs, Pareto-efficiency is used to formulate each individual's best-response condition, inducing…
This paper presents a novel partitioning method designed to minimize control performance degradation resulting from partitioning a system for distributed control while maintaining the computational benefits of these methods. A…
In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a selfish independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost \alpha. Together the agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph) while…