Related papers: A Note on the Multi-Agent Contracts in Continuous …
We are considering the problem of optimal portfolio delegation between an investor and a portfolio manager under a random default time. We focus on a novel variation of the Principal-Agent problem adapted to this framework. We address the…
In this paper, we investigate a sequential dynamic team problem consisting of two agents with a nested information structure. We use a combination of the person-by-person and prescription approach to derive structural results for optimal…
Entities in multi-agent systems may seek conflicting subobjectives, and this leads to competition between them. To address performance degradation due to competition, we consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner at the high level…
We study a bilevel \emph{max-max} optimization framework for principal-agent contract design, in which a principal chooses incentives to maximize utility while anticipating the agent's best response. This problem, central to moral hazard…
We use the recently developed probabilistic analysis of mean field games with finitely many states in the weak formulation, to set-up a principal / agent contract theory model where the principal faces a large population of agents…
In this paper, finite-time state consensus problems for continuous-time multi-agent systems are discussed, and two distributive protocols, which ensure that the states of agents reach an agreement in a finite time, are presented. By…
We analyze the dynamics of multi-agent collective behavior models and their control theoretical properties. We first derive a large population limit to parabolic diffusive equations. We also show that the non-local transport equations…
This paper studies self-sustained dynamic multiagent systems (MAS) for decentralized resource allocation operating at a competitive equilibrium over a finite horizon. The utility of resource consumption, along with the income from resource…
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some…
Control of multi-agent systems via game theory is investigated. Assume a system level object is given, the utility functions for individual agents are designed to convert a multi-agent system into a potential game. First, for fixed…
We study the optimal contract problem in the \emph{combinatorial actions} framework of D\"utting et al.~[FOCS'21], where a principal delegates a project to an agent who chooses a subset of hidden, costly actions, and the resulting reward is…
Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…
In this paper we investigate a Principal-Agent problem with moral hazard under Knightian uncertainty. We extend the seminal framework of Holmstr\"om and Milgrom by combining a Stackelberg equilibrium with a worst-case approach. We…
Motivated by the recent interest in formal methods-based control of multi-agent systems, we adopt a bottom-up approach. Each agent is subject to a local signal temporal logic task that may depend on other agents behavior. These dependencies…
We propose and investigate a discrete-time mean field game model involving risk-averse agents. The model under study is a coupled system of dynamic programming equations with a Kolmogorov equation. The agents' risk aversion is modeled by…
We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying multi-agent online learning problems in the presence of delays and asynchronicities. Specifically, we propose and analyze a class of adaptive dual averaging schemes in which agents…
We study an agent's lifecycle portfolio choice problem with stochastic labor income, borrowing constraints and a finite retirement date. Similarly to arXiv:2002.00201, wages evolve in a path-dependent way, but the presence of a finite…
This paper extends the core results of discrete time infinite horizon dynamic programming to the case of state-dependent discounting. We obtain a condition on the discount factor process under which all of the standard optimality results…