Related papers: A Note on the Multi-Agent Contracts in Continuous …
Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (a.k.a. contract) so as to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action. We relax the assumption that the principal perfectly…
We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our…
In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an approximation of Nash equilibria for multi-player non-cooperative games with a special structure. We consider the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads to a system of…
A prominent theme in behavioural contract theory is the study of present-biased agents represented through quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In a model of competitive credit provision, we study an alternative to this framework in which the…
We consider the robust contract design problem when the principal only has limited information about the actions the agent can take. The principal evaluates a contract according to its worst-case performance caused by the uncertain action…
We consider the sequential decision-making problem of making proactive request assignment and rejection decisions for a profit-maximizing operator of an autonomous mobility on demand system. We formalize this problem as a Markov decision…
We study a single-agent contracting environment where the agent has misspecified beliefs about the outcome distributions for each chosen action. First, we show that for a myopic Bayesian learning agent with only two possible actions, the…
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…
We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several…
We provide a generic method to find full dynamical solutions to binary decision models with interactions. In these models, agents follow a stochastic evolution where they must choose between two possible choices by taking into account the…
Reinforcement learning in multi-agent scenarios is important for real-world applications but presents challenges beyond those seen in single-agent settings. We present an actor-critic algorithm that trains decentralized policies in…
We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs,…
In this paper, a new on-line scheme is presented to design the optimal coordination control for the consensus problem of multi-agent differential games by fuzzy adaptive dynamic programming (FADP), which brings together game theory,…
We propose an optimal solution to a deterministic dynamic assignment problem by leveraging connections to the theory of discrete optimal transport to convert the combinatorial assignment problem into a tractable linear program. We seek to…
In this paper, we study multi-agent network games subject to affine time-varying coupling constraints and a time-varying communication network. We focus on the class of games adopting proximal dynamics and study their convergence to a…
In this paper, we show the equivalence between a constrained, multi-agent control problem, modeled within the port-Hamiltonian framework, and an exact potential game. Specifically, critical distance-based constraints determine a network of…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
The main challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning is the difficulty of learning useful policies in the presence of other simultaneously learning agents whose changing behaviors jointly affect the environment's transition and reward…