Related papers: Customers' abandonment strategy in an M/G/1 queue

We consider a large queueing system that consists of many strategic servers that are weakly interacting. Each server processes jobs from its unique critically loaded buffer and controls the rate of arrivals and departures associated with…

Consider an M/M/1-type queue where joining attains a known reward, but a known waiting cost is paid per time unit spent queueing. In the 1960s, Naor showed that any arrival optimally joins the queue if its length is less than a known…

Motivated by applications such as urban traffic control and make-to-order systems, we study a fluid model of a single-server, on-off system that can accommodate multiple queues. The server visits each queue in order: when a queue is served,…

We consider a single server system with infinite waiting room in a random environment. The service system and the environment interact in both directions. Whenever the environment enters a prespecified subset of its state space the service…

In a two node tandem network, customers decide to join or balk by maximizing a given profit function whose costs are proportional to the sojourn time they spend at each queue. Assuming that their choices are taken without knowing the…

Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the…

Efficient use of call center operators through technological innovations more often come at the expense of added operation management issues. In this paper, the stationary characteristics of an $M/G/1$ retrial queue is investigated where…

In discrete time, customers arrive at random. Each waits until one of two servers is available; each thereafter departs at random. We seek the distribution of maximum line length of idle customers. In the context of an emergency room (for…

Giving customers queue length information about a service system has the potential to influence the decision of a customer to join a queue. Thus, it is imperative for managers of queueing systems to understand how the information that they…

The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…

In most service systems, the servers are humans who desire to experience a certain level of idleness. In call centers, this manifests itself as the call avoidance behavior, where servers strategically adjust their service rate to strike a…

In this paper we consider a single-server, cyclic polling system with switch-over times and Poisson arrivals. The service disciplines that are discussed, are exhaustive and gated service. The novel contribution of the present paper is that…

We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous…

We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…

We consider a situation where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their willingness to pay as well as in their individual channel gains. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

We study a make-to-order system with a finite set of customers. Production is stochastic with a nonlinear dependence between the ordered quantity and the production rate. Customers may have to queue until their turn arrives, and therefore…

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…

We consider a dynamic model of traffic that has received a lot of attention in the past few years. Users control infinitesimal flow particles aiming to travel from an origin to a destination as quickly as possible. Flow patterns vary over…