Related papers: Customers' abandonment strategy in an M/G/1 queue
In this paper we analyze an $M/M/1$ queueing system with an arbitrary number of customer classes, with class-dependent exponential service rates and preemptive priorities between classes. The queuing system can be described by a…
This paper considers a discrete-time single-server queue with a single acceptance period for a Poissonian population of homogeneous customers. Customers are served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis, and their service times are…
We consider strategic arrivals to a FCFS service system that starts service at a fixed time and has to serve a fixed number of customers, e.g., an airplane boarding system. Arriving early induces a higher waiting cost (waiting before…
We introduce a novel single-server queue with general retrial times and event-dependent arrivals. This is a versatile model for the study of service systems, in which the server needs a non-negligible time to retrieve waiting customers upon…
A special customer must complete service from two servers in series, in either order, each with an M/M/1 queueing system. It is assumed that the two queueing system lengths are independent with initial numbers of customers a and b at the…
Strategic customer behavior is strongly influenced by the level of information that is provided to customers. Hence, to optimize the design of queueing systems, many studies consider various versions of the same service model and compare…
We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs' sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision…
Traditionally, research focusing on the design of routing and staffing policies for service systems has modeled servers as having fixed (possibly heterogeneous) service rates. However, service systems are generally staffed by people.…
Consider a population of customers each of which needs to decide independently when to arrive to a facility that provides a service during a fixed period of time, say a day. This is a common scenario in many service systems such as a bank,…
In Naor's model [17], customers decide whether or not to join a queue after observing its length. This work considers a variation in which customers are heterogeneous in their service value (reward) $R$ from completed service and…
We study a generalization of the $M/G/1$ system (denoted by $rM/G/1$) with independent and identically distributed (iid) service times and with an arrival process whose arrival rate $\lambda_0f(r)$ depends on the remaining service time $r$…
In this paper continuity theorems are established for the number of losses during a busy period of the $M/M/1/n$ queue. We consider an $M/GI/1/n$ queueing system where the service time probability distribution, slightly different in a…
We study many-server queues with abandonment in which customers have general service and patience time distributions. The dynamics of the system are modeled using measure- valued processes, to keep track of the residual service and patience…
A supermarket game is considered with $N$ FCFS queues with unit exponential service rate and global Poisson arrival rate $N \lambda$. Upon arrival each customer chooses a number of queues to be sampled uniformly at random and joins the…
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…
We analyze the latency or sojourn time L(m,n) for the last customer in a batch of n customers to exit from the m-th queue in a tandem of m queues in the setting where the queues are in equilibrium before the batch of customers arrives at…
We consider the $N$-model queueing system with a waiting time dependent threshold on the diagonal: the service discipline is First--Come--First--Served, but type-1 jobs can only be served by server 2 if their waiting time exceeds a…
This work presents a variation of Naor's strategic observable model (1969), by adding a component of customer heterogeneity induced by the location of customers in relation to the server. Accordingly, customers incur a travel cost which…
Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered…
Recent studies indicate that in many situations service times are affected by the experienced queueing delay of the particular customer. This effect has been detected in different areas, such as health care, call centers and…