Related papers: Empathy in Bimatrix Games
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden…
The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…
We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we…
Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…
Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…
Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having…
A mathematical model for behavioral changes by pair interactions (i.e. due to direct contact) of individuals is developed. Three kinds of pair interactions can be distinguished: Imitative processes, avoidance processes, and compromising…
Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…
Individuals, or organizations, cooperate with or compete against one another in a wide range of practical situations. Such strategic interactions are often modeled as games played on networks, where an individual's payoff depends not only…
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…
Recent research has taken particular interest in observing the dynamics between altruistic and individual behavior. This is a commonly approached problem when reasoning about social dilemmas, which have a plethora of real world counterparts…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
The theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we…
One-shot anonymous unselfishness in economic games is commonly explained by social preferences, which assume that people care about the monetary payoffs of others. However, during the last ten years, research has shown that different types…
This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…
Trust and reciprocation of it form the foundation of economic, social and other interactions. While the Trust Game is widely used to study these concepts for interactions between two players, often alternating different roles (i.e.,…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between…
We study the emergence of altruistic behaviour in collective games. In particular, we take into account Toral's version of collective Parrondo's paradoxical games, in which the redistribution of capital between agents, who can play…
The success of imitation as an evolutionary driving force in spatial games has often been questioned, especially for social dilemmas such as the snowdrift game, where the most profitable may be the mixed phase sustaining both the…