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A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
We compute equilibrium strategies in multi-stage games with continuous signal and action spaces as they are widely used in the management sciences and economics. Examples include sequential sales via auctions, multi-stage elimination…
Reflected diffusions naturally arise in many problems from applications ranging from economics and mathematical biology to queueing theory. In this paper we consider a class of infinite time-horizon singular stochastic control problems for…
We consider a stochastic differential equation that is controlled by means of an additive finite-variation process. A singular stochastic controller, who is a minimizer, determines this finite-variation process, while a discretionary…
This paper is concerned with the controller-and-stopper stochastic differential game under a regime switching model in an infinite horizon. The state of the system consists of a number of diffusions \emph{coupled} by a continuous-time…
We study a class of zero-sum stochastic games between a stopper and a singular-controller, previously considered in [Bovo and De Angelis (2025)]. The underlying singularly-controlled dynamics takes values in…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
In this paper we introduce and solve a class of optimal stopping problems of recursive type. In particular, the stopping payoff depends directly on the value function of the problem itself. In a multi-dimensional Markovian setting we show…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
We formulate a notion of doubly reflected BSDE in the case where the barriers $\xi$ and $\zeta$ do not satisfy any regularity assumption and with a general filtration. Under a technical assumption (a Mokobodzki-type condition), we show…
This paper investigates a class of games with large strategy spaces, motivated by challenges in AI alignment and language games. We introduce the hidden game problem, where for each player, an unknown subset of strategies consistently…
We study a class of zero-sum games between a singular-controller and a stopper over finite-time horizon. The underlying process is a multi-dimensional (locally non-degenerate) controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE) evolving in an…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
This paper considers time-inconsistent problems when control and stopping strategies are required to be made simultaneously (called stopping control problems by us). We first formulate the timeinconsistent stopping control problems under…
Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
This article is dedicated to the study of mixed zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games in the situation when the player's cost functionals are modeled by doubly controlled reflected backward stochastic equations with two barriers…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…