Related papers: Rationalizability and Epistemic Priority Orderings
We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter's concept of \emph{superrationality}. We start by defining superrationally justifiable actions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs of the players, in a way that…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…
We study a game-theoretic information retrieval model in which strategic publishers aim to maximize their chances of being ranked first by the search engine while maintaining the integrity of their original documents. We show that the…
The paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over strategies. The language also provides a natural way to represent what agents would know were they to be aware of the strategies being used by…
In an interactive belief model, are the players "commonly meta-certain" of the model itself? This paper formalizes such implicit "common meta-certainty" assumption. To that end, the paper expands the objects of players' beliefs from events…
We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…
We present a new system S for handling uncertainty in a quantified modal logic (first-order modal logic). The system is based on both probability theory and proof theory. The system is derived from Chisholm's epistemology. We concretize…
The notion of argumentation and the one of belief stand in a problematic relation to one another. On the one hand, argumentation is crucial for belief formation: as the outcome of a process of arguing, an agent might come to (justifiably)…
This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation, yet existing research has mostly evaluated their adherence to…
Our goal is to develop a partial ordering method for comparing stochastic choice functions on the basis of their individual rationality. To this end, we assign to any stochastic choice function a one-parameter class of deterministic choice…
We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a…
The standard rational choice model describes individuals as making choices by selecting the best option from a menu. A wealth of evidence instead suggests that individuals often filter menus into smaller sets - consideration sets - from…
In this work, an abstract and general language for the fundamental objects underlying dynamic games under probabilistic uncertainty is developed. Combining the theory of decision trees by Al\'os-Ferrer--Ritzberger (2005) and a Harsanyian…
People rationalize their past choices, even those that were mistakes in hindsight. We propose a formal theory of this behavior. The theory predicts that sunk costs affect later choices. Its model primitives are identified by choice behavior…
Humans display a tendency to pay more attention to bad outcomes, often in a disproportionate way relative to their statistical occurrence. They also display euphorism, as well as a preference for the current state of affairs (status quo…
Justification theory is a unifying semantic framework. While it has its roots in non-monotonic logics, it can be applied to various areas in computer science, especially in explainable reasoning; its most central concept is a justification:…
We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among rational agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form games equipped with an interaction structure, which specifies which groups of players…
Making decisions freely presupposes that there is some indeterminacy in the environment and in the decision making engine. The former is reflected on the behavioral changes due to communicating: few changes indicate rigid environments;…
While game theory is widely used to model strategic interactions, a natural question is where do the game representations come from? One answer is to learn the representations from data. If one wants to learn both the payoffs and the…