Related papers: Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Netw…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, the defender can anticipate attacker actions; it can mislead or lure attacker, or hide real resources. Although defensive deception is increasingly…
This paper studies the sensor placement problem in a networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game between an attacker and a detector. The attacker's…
A recurring theme in recent computer science literature is that proper design of signaling schemes is a crucial aspect of effective mechanisms aiming to optimize social welfare or revenue. One of the research endeavors of this line of work…
We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…
In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…
Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…
We train two neural networks adversarially to play static games. At each iteration, a row and column network observe a new random bimatrix game and output individual mixed strategies. The parameters of each network are independently updated…
Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide…
With the increasing sophistication of attacks on cyber-physical systems, deception has emerged as an effective tool to improve system security and safety by obfuscating the attacker's perception. In this paper, we present a solution to the…
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…
The timing channel is a logical communication channel in which information is encoded in the timing between events. Recently, the use of the timing channel has been proposed as a countermeasure to reactive jamming attacks performed by an…
This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…
We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…
Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…
Existing settings of decentralized learning either require players to have full information or the system to have certain special structure that may be hard to check and hinder their applicability to practical systems. To overcome this, we…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…