Related papers: Regular Potential Games
We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential…
Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…
In this paper, a gentle introduction to Game Theory is presented in the form of basic concepts and examples. Minimax and Nash's theorem are introduced as the formal definitions for optimal strategies and equilibria in zero-sum and…
Algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have recently been applied to a number of security domains. However, many of the techniques developed for compact representations of security games do not extend to {\em Bayesian} security…
We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is a natural assumption that the players' actions cannot anticipate future values of their types. Such games go under…
We study natural improvement dynamics in weighted congestion games with polynomial latencies of maximum degree $d\geq 1$. We focus on two problems regarding the existence and efficiency of approximate pure Nash equilibria, with a reasonable…
We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect…
We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…
The notion of interchangeability has been introduced by John Nash in one of his original papers on equilibria. This paper studies properties of Nash equilibria interchangeability in cellular games that model behavior of infinite chain of…
We extend the concept of meta-Nash equilibrium, introduced by Eshaghi Gordji and Bagha [2026] for complete-information games, to environments with incomplete information. We define a meta-Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a profile of…
This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a class of linear regular diffusions with not non-singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of It\^o and McKean (1974), p.\ 108). We provide sufficient conditions under…
Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory,…
Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the…
We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…
In 1953, Kuhn showed that every sequential game has a Nash equilibrium by showing that a procedure, named ``backward induction'' in game theory, yields a Nash equilibrium. It actually yields Nash equilibria that define a proper subclass of…
Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…
We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games [6] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [7]. The idea is to extend the domain of the utility function to situations, maximal consistent sets in…
We study a class of distributionally robust games where agents are allowed to heterogeneously choose their risk aversion with respect to distributional shifts of the uncertainty. In our formulation, heterogeneous Wasserstein ball…
In a society of multiple individuals, if everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, will there exist any equilibrium for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody…
We study stochastic Nash equilibrium problems subject to heterogeneous uncertainty on the expected valued cost functions of the individual agents, where we assume no prior knowledge of the underlying probability distributions of the…