Related papers: Regular Potential Games
The aim of this paper is to study first order Mean field games subject to a linear controlled dynamics on $\mathbb R^{d}$. For this kind of problems, we define Nash equilibria (called Mean Field Games equilibria), as Borel probability…
We introduce a new class of population games that we call monotropic; these are games characterized by the presence of a unique globally neutrally stable Nash equilibrium. Monotropic games generalize strictly concave potential games and…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
Motivated by the fact that in many game-theoretic settings, the game analyzed is only an approximation to the game being played, in this work we analyze equilibrium computation for the broad and natural class of bimatrix games that are…
The generalized Nash equilibrium problems play a significant role in modeling and analyzing several complex economics problems. In this work, we consider jointly convex generalized Nash games which were introduced by Rosen. We study two…
If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support…
Static potential games are non-cooperative games which admit a fictitious function, also referred to as a potential function, such that the minimizers of this function constitute a subset (or a refinement) of the Nash equilibrium strategies…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
A solution concept that is a refinement of Nash equilibria selects for each finite game a nonempty collection of closed and connected subsets of Nash equilibria as solutions. We impose three axioms for such solution concepts. The axiom of…
We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique…
This paper is devoted to Nash equilibrium for games in capacities. Such games with payoff expressed by Choquet integral were considered by Kozhan and Zarichnyi (Nash equilibria for games in capacities, Econ. Theory {\bf 35} (2008) 321--331)…
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model…
In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some messages are received. Those games satisfy a crucial property of usual bi-matrix games: there are only a finite number of required (mixed)…
In this paper we focus on noncooperative games with uncertain constraints coupling the agents' decisions. We consider a setting where bounded deviations of agents' decisions from the equilibrium are possible, and uncertain constraints are…
We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which $n$ selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming that players…
We study stochastic mean-field games among finite number of teams with large finite as well as infinite number of decision makers. For this class of games within static and dynamic settings, we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium,…