Related papers: On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games
Humans possess innate collaborative capacities. However, effective teamwork often remains challenging. This study delves into the feasibility of collaboration within teams of rational, self-interested agents who engage in teamwork without…
We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of the game is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably their actions should not anticipate the future values of their types. When…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…
In this work, we study the interaction of strategic agents in continuous action Cournot games with limited information feedback. Cournot game is the essential market model for many socio-economic systems where agents learn and compete…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP-hard to decide whether a given strategy is a best response…
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…
In this paper, we study proximal type dynamics in the context of noncooperative multi-agent network games. These dynamics arise in different applications, since they describe distributed decision making in multi-agent networks, e.g., in…
Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
This paper studies the resilience of second-order networked dynamical systems to strategic attacks. We discuss two widely used control laws, which have applications in power networks and formation control of autonomous agents. In the first…
A systematic framework for analyzing dynamical attributes of games has not been well-studied except for the special class of potential or near-potential games. In particular, the existing results have shortcomings in determining the…
A game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems where the time-inconsistency is due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward is developed. A class of mixed strategy stopping times that allows…
We study the class of reach-avoid dynamic games in which multiple agents interact noncooperatively, and each wishes to satisfy a distinct target criterion while avoiding a failure criterion. Reach-avoid games are commonly used to express…