Related papers: Networked Fairness in Cake Cutting
In this article we propose a probabilistic framework in order to study the fair division of a divisible good, e.g., a cake, between n players. Our framework follows the same idea than the ''Full independence model'' used in the study of…
We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to find an envy-free allocation based on queries from $n$ agents. The problem has received attention in computer science, mathematics, and economics. It has been a major…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, also known as cake cutting, with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be sufficiently separated from one another. This captures, for…
We consider the problem of partitioning an undirected graph (representing a social network) over $n$ nodes and max degree $\Delta$ into $k$ equally sized parts. Each node in the graph, representing an agent, derives utility proportional to…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under an additional constraint: there is an undirected graph describing the relationship between the items, and each agent's share must form a connected subgraph of this graph. This framework…
When allocating a set of indivisible items among agents, the ideal condition of envy-freeness cannot always be achieved. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), and envy-freeness with $k$ hidden items (HEF-$k$) are two very compelling…
The paper considers fair allocation of resources that are already allocated in an unfair way. This setting requires a careful balance between the fairness considerations and the rights of the present owners. The paper presents re-division…
We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in order to receive a better allocation. A…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be…
The fair division literature in economics considers how to divide resources between multiple agents such that the allocation is envy-free: each agent receives their favorite piece. Researchers have developed a variety of fair division…
In classic fair division problems such as cake cutting and rent division, envy-freeness requires that each individual (weakly) prefer his allocation to anyone else's. On a conceptual level, we argue that envy-freeness also provides a…
We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in…
In the classic problem of fair cake-cutting, a single interval ("cake") has to be divided among n agents with different value measures, giving each agent a single sub-interval with a value of at least 1/n of the total. This paper studies a…
We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing envy-free allocations, restricted to the case of four agents. The problem asks for a partition of the cake to four agents, so that every agent finds her piece at least as valuable as…
We study classic fair-division problems in a partial information setting. This paper respectively addresses fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods among agents with cardinal preferences. We will show that, for all of these…
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a ``cake'' (i.e., a divisible resource) and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players feels to have received a ``fair'' amount of the cake. An important…
We consider multi-layered cake cutting in order to fairly allocate numerous divisible resources (layers of cake) among a group of agents under two constraints: contiguity and feasibility. We first introduce a new computational model in a…
We study the query complexity of cake cutting and give lower and upper bounds for computing approximately envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations with the minimum number of cuts. The lower bounds are tight for computing connected…
We study the computational complexity of finding fair allocations of indivisible goods in the setting where a social network on the agents is given. Notions of fairness in this context are "localized", that is, agents are only concerned…
Cake cutting is a classic fair division problem, with the cake serving as a metaphor for a heterogeneous divisible resource. Recently, it was shown that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, it is possible to…