Related papers: SqORAM: Read-Optimized Sequential Write-Only Obliv…
Write-Only Oblivious RAM (WoORAM) protocols provide privacy by encrypting the contents of data and also hiding the pattern of write operations over that data. WoORAMs provide better privacy than plain encryption and better performance than…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive which obfuscates the access patterns to a storage thereby preventing privacy leakage. So far in the current literature, only `fully functional' ORAMs are widely studied which can protect, at…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) hides the memory access patterns, enhancing data privacy by preventing attackers from discovering sensitive information based on the sequence of memory accesses. The performance of ORAM is often limited by its inherent…
Keystone is a trusted execution environment, based on RISC-V architecture. It divides the memory into a secure Keystone private memory and an unsecure non-Keystone memory, and allows code that lies inside the Keystone private memory to…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) protocols are powerful techniques that hide a client's data as well as access patterns from untrusted service providers. We present an oblivious cloud storage system, ObliviSync, that specifically targets one of the…
Reducing the database space overhead is critical in big-data processing. In this paper, we revisit oblivious RAM (ORAM) using big-data standard for the database space overhead. ORAM is a cryptographic primitive that enables users to perform…
Modern processors, e.g., Intel SGX, allow applications to isolate secret code and data in encrypted memory regions called enclaves. While encryption effectively hides the contents of memory, the sequence of address references issued by the…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a client to securely execute RAM programs over data that is stored in an untrusted server. Distributed Oblivious RAM is a variant of ORAM, where the data is stored in $m>1$…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a well-researched primitive to hide the memory access pattern of a RAM computation; it has a variety of applications in trusted computing, outsourced storage, and multiparty computation. In this paper, we study the…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a provable secure primitive to prevent access pattern leakage on the memory bus. It serves as the intermediate layer between the trusted on-chip components and the untrusted external memory systems to modulate the…
Access patterns to data stored remotely create a side channel that is known to leak information even if the content of the data is encrypted. To protect against access pattern leakage, Oblivious RAM is a cryptographic primitive that…
ConcurORAM is a parallel, multi-client oblivious RAM (ORAM) that eliminates waiting for concurrent stateless clients and allows overall throughput to scale gracefully, without requiring trusted third party components (proxies) or direct…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) allows a client to securely retrieve elements from outsourced servers without leakage about the accessed elements or their virtual addresses. Two-server ORAM, designed for secure two-party RAM computation, stores data…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM), introduced in the context of software protection by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [JACM'96], aims at obfuscating the memory access pattern induced by a RAM computation. Ideally, the memory access pattern of an ORAM should be…
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a renowned technique to hide the access patterns of an application to an untrusted memory. According to the standard ORAM definition presented by Goldreich and Ostrovsky, two ORAM access sequences must be…
It is well known that encryption alone is not enough to protect data privacy. Access patterns, revealed when operations are performed, can also be leveraged in inference attacks. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) hides access patterns by making client…
In this work, we investigate if statistical privacy can enhance the performance of ORAM mechanisms while providing rigorous privacy guarantees. We propose a formal and rigorous framework for developing ORAM protocols with statistical…
A major algorithmic challenge in designing applications intended for secure remote execution is ensuring that they are oblivious to their inputs, in the sense that their memory access patterns do not leak sensitive information to the…
Intel SGX has been a popular trusted execution environment (TEE) for protecting the integrity and confidentiality of applications running on untrusted platforms such as cloud. However, the access patterns of SGX-based programs can still be…
The problem of Oblivious RAM (ORAM) has traditionally been studied in a single-server setting, but more recently the multi-server setting has also been considered. Yet it is still unclear whether the multi-server setting has any inherent…