Related papers: Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge Cos…
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations…
We proposed an evolving network model constituted by the same nodes but different edges. The competition between nodes and different links were introduced. Scale free properties have been found in this model by continuum theory. Different…
Payment networks were introduced to address the limitation on the transaction throughput of popular blockchains. To open a payment channel one has to publish a transaction on-chain and pay the appropriate transaction fee. A transaction can…
We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic selfish routing games. In our model, latencies are subject to (bounded) deviations which are taken into account by the players. The quality…
An atomic routing game is a multiplayer game on a directed graph. Each player in the game chooses a path -- a sequence of links that connect its origin node to its destination node -- with the lowest cost, where the cost of each link is a…
In this paper we study quality measures of different solution concepts for the multicast network design game on a ring topology. We recall from the literature a lower bound of 4/3 and prove a matching upper bound for the price of stability,…
We analyze the setting of minimum-cost perfect matchings with selfish vertices through the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) lens. The underlying solution concept used for this analysis is the Gale-Shapley stable matching…
We introduce a heterogeneous connection model for network formation to capture the effect of cost heterogeneity on the structure of efficient networks. In the proposed model, connection costs are assumed to be separable, which means the…
We study assignment games in which jobs select machines, and in which certain pairs of jobs may conflict, which is to say they may incur an additional cost when they are both assigned to the same machine, beyond that associated with the…
In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…
Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack, as well as…
In recent years, the recognition of free-hand sketches has remained a popular task. However, in some special fields such as the military field, free-hand sketches are difficult to sample on a large scale. Common data augmentation and image…
The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically, we consider how the incentives of the…
We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with $n$ agents. We focus on the model of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior…
The congestion pricing is an efficient allocation approach to mediate demand and supply of network resources. Different from the previous pricing using Affine Marginal Cost (AMC), we focus on studying the game between network coding and…
This paper studies the performance of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) when the nodes, that form a Poisson point process, selfishly choose their Medium Access Probability (MAP). We consider goodput and delay as the performance metric that…
Let $G$ be a graph with edge set $(e_1,e_2,...e_N)$. We independently associate to each edge $e_i$ of $G$ a cost ${x}_i$ that is drawn from a Uniform [0, 1] distribution. Suppose $\mathcal{F}$ is a set of targeted structures that consists…
Estimating network formation models with degree heterogeneity raises two problems in empirical networks. First, agents that send no links, receive no links, or link to all remaining agents can make the fixed-effects MLE fail to exist.…
We study the problems of pricing an indivisible product to consumers who are embedded in a given social network. The goal is to maximize the revenue of the seller. We assume impatient consumers who buy the product as soon as the seller…
We provide a framework for modeling social network formation through conditional multinomial logit models from discrete choice and random utility theory, in which each new edge is viewed as a "choice" made by a node to connect to another…