The Price of Matching Selfish Vertices
Computational Geometry
2015-03-19 v4
Abstract
We analyze the setting of minimum-cost perfect matchings with selfish vertices through the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) lens. The underlying solution concept used for this analysis is the Gale-Shapley stable matching notion, where the preferences are determined so that each player (vertex) wishes to minimize the cost of her own matching edge.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1112.4632,
title = {The Price of Matching Selfish Vertices},
author = {Yuval Emek and Tobias Langner and Roger Wattenhofer},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1112.4632},
year = {2015}
}
Comments
We changed the perspective of our paper and now look at the minimum-cost perfect matching problem through the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) lens. Our previous results can be seen as analyzing the PoS of minimum-cost perfect matching and we now added an analysis of the PoA of this problem