Related papers: Breaking ties in collective decision making
We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…
We develop an abstract axiomatic theory of tie-breaking. A tie-breaking input consists of a finite set N of players, a weak order on N representing the standings to be refined, and an auxiliary information item drawn from a set on which the…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous cake between a number of players with different tastes. In this setting, it is known that fairness requirements may result in a suboptimal division from the social welfare…
We study an extension of the voter model in which each agent is endowed with an innate preference for one of two states that we term as "truth" or "falsehood". Due to interactions with neighbors, an agent that innately prefers truth can be…
Preferences for mixing can reveal ambiguity perception and attitude on a single event. The validity of the approach is discussed for multiple preference classes including maxmin, maxmax, variational, and smooth second-order preferences. An…
Privacy and nondiscrimination are related but different. We make this observation precise in two ways. First, we show that both privacy and nondiscrimination have two versions, a causal version and a statical associative version, with each…
Voting rules may implement the will of the society when all eligible voters vote, and only them. However, they may fail to do so when sybil (fake or duplicate) votes are present and when only some honest (non sybil) voters actively…
We design and implement lab experiments to evaluate the normative appeal of behavior arising from models of ambiguity-averse preferences. We report two main empirical findings. First, we demonstrate that behavior reflects an incomplete…
We analyze the relation between strategy-proofness and preference reversal in the case that agents may declare indifference. Interestingly, Berga and Moreno (2020), have recently derived preference reversal from group strategy-proofness of…
We investigate joint probabilistic choice rules describing the behavior of two decision makers, each facing potentially distinct menus. These rules are separable when they can be decomposed into individual choices correlated solely through…
The Maskin's theorem is a fundamental work in the theory of mechanism design. In this paper, we will propose a self-enforcing agreement by which agents can fight a bad social choice rule which satisfies monotonicity and no-veto if an…
We consider a model where an agent is must choose between alternatives that each provide only an imprecise description of the world (e.g. linguistic expressions). The set of alternatives is closed under logical conjunction and disjunction,…
We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…
The prevalence of misinformation on online social media has tangible empirical connections to increasing political polarization and partisan antipathy in the United States. Ranking algorithms for social recommendation often encode broad…
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation. Although it has been a common practice to represent reputations by binary values, either `good' or `bad', such a dichotomy is a…
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments…
Ranked decision systems -- recommenders, ad auctions, clinical triage queues -- must decide when to intervene in ranked outputs and when to abstain. We study when confidence-based abstention monotonically improves decision quality, and when…
In this paper, we investigate deliberation procedures that invite citizens with contextual opinions to explore alternative thinking frames. Contextuality is captured in a simple quantum cognitive model. We show how disagreeing citizens…
Many social networks in our daily life are bipartite networks built on reciprocity. How can we recommend users/friends to a user, so that the user is interested in and attractive to recommended users? In this research, we propose a new…