Related papers: Value Asymptotics in Dynamic Games on Large Horizo…

We study the proportional division value in TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to each player's stand-alone worth. Focusing on fixed-population consistency, we characterize the proportional division…

In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with Borel state and action spaces and bounded reward. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

In this paper, we investigate a partially observable zero sum games where the state process is a discrete time Markov chain. We consider a general utility function in the optimization criterion. We show the existence of value for both…

We prove the almost equivalence of the minimax theorem and the strong duality theorem for a large class of games and conic programs. The previous fundamental results on the equivalence of linear programming and two-player zero-sum games…

We consider a general formulation of the Principal-Agent problem with a lump-sum payment on a finite horizon, providing a systematic method for solving such problems. Our approach is the following: we first find the contract that is optimal…

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a…

We study $\lambda$-discounted zero-sum games as the discount factor $\lambda$ approaches $0$ (that is, the players are more and more patient), in the context of games with stage duration. In stochastic games with stage duration $h$, players…

This paper proposes and studies a general form of dynamic $N$-player non-cooperative games called $\alpha$-potential games, where the change of a player's value function upon her unilateral deviation from her strategy is equal to the change…

In the present paper, we study a two-player zero-sum deterministic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls, in infinite time horizon, under rather weak assumptions on the cost functions. We prove by means of the…

This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that when the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of approximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any point in the game…

In this paper, we study a class of discrete-time mean-field games under the infinite-horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost optimality criterion. Risk-sensitivity is introduced for each agent (player) via an exponential utility function. In…

For a zero-sum stochastic game which does not satisfy the Isaacs condition, we provide a value function representation for an Isaacs-type equation whose Hamiltonian lies in between the lower and upper Hamiltonians, as a convex combination…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…

In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…

We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {-1,1}. If there is uniqueness of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the…

Autonomous agents should coordinate effectively without prior knowledge of others' intents. While prior work has focused on intent inference, we address the inverse problem: how agents can strategically demonstrate their intents within…

We consider a general type of non-Markovian impulse control problems under adverse non-linear expectation or, more specifically, the zero-sum game problem where the adversary player decides the probability measure. We show that the upper…

We study the value of a two-player zero-sum game on a random matrix $M\in \mathbb{R}^{n\times m}$, defined by $v(M) = \min_{x\in\Delta_n}\max_{y\in \Delta_m}x^T M y$. In the setting where $n=m$ and $M$ has i.i.d. standard Gaussian entries,…