Related papers: Strategic Dynamic Pricing with Network Effects

This paper studies a setting in which multiple suppliers compete for a buyer's procurement business. The buyer faces uncertain demand and there is a requirement to reserve capacity in advance of knowing the demand. Each supplier has costs…

Users can now give back energies to the grid using distributed resources. Proper incentive mechanisms are required for such users, also known as prosumers, in order to maximize the sell-back amount while maintaining the retailer's profit.…

Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…

We address the challenging problem of dynamically pricing complementary items that are sequentially displayed to customers. An illustrative example is the online sale of flight tickets, where customers navigate through multiple web pages.…

Discrete-choice models are used in economics, marketing and revenue management to predict customer purchase probabilities, say as a function of prices and other features of the offered assortment. While they have been shown to be…

We study multi-product monopoly pricing where the seller jointly designs the selling mechanism and the information structure for the buyer to learn his values. Unlike the case with exogenous information, we show that when the seller…

We provide a strategic model of the formation of production networks that subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach. The objective of firms in our setting is to choose their supply relationships so as to maximize their profit at…

We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…

Efficient large-scale network allocation requires data-driven pricing mechanisms that internalize the stochastic and non-linear dynamics of user behavior. We move beyond the classic fully strategic agents to study oblivious users (agents…

We propose a new efficient online algorithm to learn the parameters governing the purchasing behavior of a utility maximizing buyer, who responds to prices, in a repeated interaction setting. The key feature of our algorithm is that it can…

This paper analyzes the impact of peer effects on electricity consumption of a network of rational, utility-maximizing users. Users derive utility from consuming electricity as well as consuming less energy than their neighbors. However, a…

We investigate the relationship between product offerings, information dissemination, and consumer decision-making in a monopolistic screening environment in which consumers lack information about their valuation of quality-differentiated…

We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other…

This paper studies optimal bundling of products with non-additive values. Under monotonic preferences and single-peaked profits, I show a monopolist finds pure bundling optimal if and only if the optimal sales volume for the grand bundle is…

We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already knows, as well as with any additional buyers to whom she is…

We address the problem of improving bidders' strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions and introduce a simple and generic method to design novel bidding strategies if the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. We…

We consider a principal seller with $m$ heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but faces competition from smaller and more agile single-item…

A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms -- such as pure bundling or separate sales --…

We consider dynamic pricing with many products under an evolving but low-dimensional demand model. Assuming the temporal variation in cross-elasticities exhibits low-rank structure based on fixed (latent) features of the products, we show…

The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow…