Related papers: Operation Frames and Clubs in Kidney Exchange
Current kidney exchange pools are of moderate size and thin, as they consist of many highly sensitized patients. Creating a thicker pool can be done by waiting for many pairs to arrive. We analyze a simple class of matching algorithms that…
Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…
Kidney Exchange Programmes (KEPs) facilitate the exchange of kidneys, and larger pools of recipient-donor pairs tend to yield proportionally more transplants, leading to the proposal of international KEPs (IKEPs). However, as studied by…
The burgeoning need for kidney transplantation mandates immediate attention. Mismatch of deceased donor-recipient kidney leads to post-transplant death. To ensure ideal kidney donor-recipient match and minimize post-transplant deaths, the…
The study of matching theory has gained importance recently with applications in Kidney Exchange, House Allocation, School Choice etc. The general theme of these problems is to allocate goods in a fair manner amongst participating agents.…
In the query-commit problem we are given a graph where edges have distinct probabilities of existing. It is possible to query the edges of the graph, and if the queried edge exists then its endpoints are irrevocably matched. The goal is to…
We design a flexible algorithm that exploits deceased donor kidneys to initiate chains of living donor kidney paired donations, combining deceased and living donor allocation mechanisms to improve the quantity and quality of kidney…
Relatives and friends of an end-stage renal disease patient who offer to donate a kidney are often found to be incompatible with their intended recipients. Kidney paired donation matches one patient and his incompatible donor with another…
To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each…
Background: The kidney exchange problem (KEP) addresses the matching of patients in need for a replacement organ with compatible living donors. Ideally many medical institutions should participate in a matching program to increase the…
We introduce partitioned matching games as a suitable model for international kidney exchange programmes, where in each round the total number of available kidney transplants needs to be distributed amongst the participating countries in a…
Despite efforts to increase the supply of organs from living donors, most kidney transplants performed in Australia still come from deceased donors. The age of these donated organs has increased substantially in recent decades as the rate…
Kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for end-stage renal disease, yet the scarcity of donors and inefficiencies in allocation systems create major bottlenecks, resulting in prolonged wait times and alarming mortality rates.…
This paper introduces a new learning-based approach for approximately solving the Kidney-Exchange Problem (KEP), an NP-hard problem on graphs. The problem consists of, given a pool of kidney donors and patients waiting for kidney donations,…
We propose a simulation-optimization-based methodology to improve the way that organ transplant offers are made to potential recipients. Our policy can be applied to all types of organs, is implemented starting at the local level, is…
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…
A kidney transplant can improve the life expectancy and quality of life of patients with end-stage renal failure. Even more patients could be helped with a transplant if the rate of kidneys that are discarded and not transplanted could be…
Kidney exchange programs have substantially increased transplantation rates but also raise critical concerns about fairness in organ allocation. We propose a novel framework leveraging Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to evaluate multiple…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals. Ashlagi et…