Related papers: Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets

In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…

This paper studies decentralized re-equilibration following population shocks, such as worker exits or firm entries, in many-to-many matching markets with contracts under substitutable preferences. We show that restricting any pre-shock…

In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These…

This paper studies the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a two-sided market in which agents behave strategically and trade according to the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. By assuming that altruistic agents have concerns for others on the…

Market Mill is a complex dependence pattern leading to nonlinear correlations and predictability in intraday dynamics of stock prices. The present paper puts together previous efforts to build a dynamical model reflecting the market mill…

I study a two-sided marriage market in which agents have incomplete preferences -- i.e., they find some alternatives incomparable. The strong (weak) core consists of matchings wherein no coalition wants to form a new match between…

This study considers a model of the income distribution of agents whose pairwise interaction is asymmetric and price-invariant. Asymmetric transactions are typical for chain-trading groups who arrange their business such that commodities…

Two-sided matching markets have been widely studied in the literature due to their rich applications. Since participants are usually uncertain about their preferences, online algorithms have recently been adopted to learn them through…

Model merging has shown great promise at combining expert models, but the benefit of merging is unclear when merging "generalist" models trained on many tasks. We explore merging in the context of large (~100B) models, by recycling…

We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…

It has been assumed that arbitrage profits are not possible in efficient markets, because future prices are not predictable. Here we show that predictability alone is not a sufficient measure of market efficiency. We instead propose to…

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and…

We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…

In the current digital age of the Internet, with ever-growing networks and data-driven business models, digital platforms and especially marketplaces are becoming increasingly important. These platforms focus primarily on digital businesses…

We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…

In the present paper a model of a market consisting of real and financial interacting sectors is studied. Agents populating the stock market are assumed to be not able to observe the true underlying fundamental, and their beliefs are biased…

We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which guarantees that the two sides be treated symmetrically. All…

We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…

Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…