Related papers: Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets
This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show…
Technological advancement has lead to an increase in number and type of trading venues and diversification of goods traded. These changes have re-emphasized the importance of understanding the effects of market competition: does…
We introduce a mathematical theory called market connectivity that gives concrete ways to both measure the efficiency of markets and find inefficiencies in large markets. The theory leads to new methods for testing the famous efficient…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
In the real world, people/entities usually find matches independently and autonomously, such as finding jobs, partners, roommates, etc. It is possible that this search for matches starts with no initial knowledge of the environment. We…
In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
We consider multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995), which extend Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) from one dimension to higher dimensions. In this model, Pareto efficiency is incompatible with individual…
Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner…
In risk-sharing markets with aggregate uncertainty, characterizing Pareto-optimal allocations when agents might not be risk averse is a challenging task, and the literature has only provided limited explicit results thus far. In particular,…
This paper considers ideal gas-like models of trading markets, where each agent is identified as a gas molecule that interacts with others trading in elastic or money-conservative collisions. Traditionally, these models introduce different…
The emph{securities market} is the fundamental theoretical framework in economics and finance for resource allocation under uncertainty. Securities serve both to reallocate risk and to disseminate probabilistic information. emph{Complete}…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
Malicious softwares or malwares for short have become a major security threat. While originating in criminal behavior, their impact are also influenced by the decisions of legitimate end users. Getting agents in the Internet, and in…
We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1998; Basteck, 2025) where objects have to be assigned to agents. We show that if a lottery rule satisfies ex-post non-wastefulness and…
Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs.…
With model uncertainty characterized by a convex, possibly non-dominated set of probability measures, the agent minimizes the cost of hedging a path dependent contingent claim with given expected success ratio, in a discrete-time,…
We study a dynamic matching setting where homogeneous agents arrive at random according to a Poisson process and randomly form edges yielding a sparse market. Agents stay in the market according to a certain sojourn time and wait to be…