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The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
The game of \emph{Showcase Showdown} with unlimited spins is investigated as an $n$-players continuous game, and the Nash Equilibrium strategies for the players are obtained. The sequential game with information on the results of the…
We consider the relation between Sion's minimax theorem for a continuous function and a Nash equilibrium in a multi-players game with two groups which is zero-sum and symmetric in each group. We will show the following results. 1. The…
We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for…
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players'…
In this paper we consider an infinite horizon zero-sum differential game where the dynamics of each player and the running cost are also depending on the evolution of some discrete (switching) variables. In particular, such switching…
In this paper, we consider discrete-time partially observed mean-field games with the risk-sensitive optimality criterion. We introduce risk-sensitivity behaviour for each agent via an exponential utility function. In the game model, each…
We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information on the payoff and without Isaacs condition. The dynamics is an ordinary differential equation parametrised by two controls chosen by the players. Each player…
In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…
A zero-sum two person Perfect Information Stochastic game (PISG) under limiting average payoff has a value and both the maximiser and the minimiser have optimal pure stationary strategies. Firstly we form the matrix of undiscounted payoffs…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
We introduce and investigate certain $N$ player dynamic games on the line and in the plane that admit Coulomb gas dynamics as a Nash equilibrium. Most significantly, we find that the universal local limit of the equilibrium is sensitive to…
Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The algorithm…
We obtain error estimates for strong approximations of a diffusion with a diffusion matrix $\sigma$ and a drift b by the discrete time process defined recursively X_N((n+1)/N) = X_N(n/N)+N^{1/2}\sigma(X_N(n/N))\xi(n+1)+N^{-1}b(XN(n/N));…
We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…
We consider repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 with the total payoff given by the non-normalized sum of stage gains. In the classical examples the value $V_N$ of such an $N$-stage game is of the…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…
The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…