Related papers: Competitive Equilibrium For Almost All Incomes: Ex…

An economy, large or small, has traditionally been defined in terms of an explicit set of agents and an assignment of characteristics to each agent. But when individual agents are negligible, most economically relevant properties of an…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under cardinality constraints, where each agent must receive a bundle of fixed size. This models practical scenarios, such as assigning shifts or forming equally sized teams. Recently,…

We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is…

We study the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number of buyers. Each seller can offer multiple units of a commodity depending on the availability of the commodity which is random and may be different for different sellers.…

We introduce a notion of competitive signaling equilibrium (CSE) in one-to-one matching markets with a continuum of heterogeneous senders and receivers. We then study monotone CSE where equilibrium outcomes - sender actions, receiver…

Competing firms tend to select similar locations for their stores. This phenomenon, called the principle of minimum differentiation, was captured by Hotelling with a landmark model of spatial competition but is still the object of an…

General Equilibrium Theory is the benchmark of economics, especially its results concerning the efficient allocation of resources, known as the First and Second Welfare Theorems. Yet, General Equilibrium Theory is beyond the scope of most…

We prove the global existence of an incomplete, continuous-time finite-agent Radner equilibrium in which exponential agents optimize their expected utility over both running consumption and terminal wealth. The market consists of a traded…

We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…

Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each pair of agents might require the (hypothetical) removal of a…

Behavioural economists have shown that people are often averse to inequality and will make choices to avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we consider how to allocate indivisible goods fairly so as to minimize inequality. We consider how…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items and a desirable heterogeneous divisible good (i.e., cake) to agents with additive utilities. In our paper, each indivisible item can be a good that yields non-negative utilities to…

We study fair division of indivisible chores among $n$ agents with additive disutility functions. Two well-studied fairness notions for indivisible items are envy-freeness up to one/any item (EF1/EFX) and the standard notion of economic…

Nash equilibrium (NE) is a central concept in game theory. Here we prove formally a published theorem on existence of an NE in two proof assistants, Coq and Isabelle: starting from a game with finitely many outcomes, one may derive a game…

We consider a novel setting where a set of items are matched to the same set of agents repeatedly over multiple rounds. Each agent gets exactly one item per round, which brings interesting challenges to finding efficient and/or fair {\em…

When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…

We study an online allocation problem with sequentially arriving items and adversarially chosen agent values, with the goal of balancing fairness and efficiency. Our goal is to study the performance of algorithms that achieve strong…

We investigate the online fair allocation problem with sequentially arriving items under various input models, with the goal of balancing fairness and efficiency. We propose the unconstrained PACE (Pacing According to Current Estimated…

When allocating indivisible resources or tasks, an envy-free allocation or equitable allocation may not exist. We present a sufficient condition and an algorithm to achieve envy-freeness and equitability when monetary transfers are allowed.…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are goods, numerous positive and negative results…