Related papers: The Query Complexity of Cake Cutting
Cake-cutting protocols aim at dividing a ``cake'' (i.e., a divisible resource) and assigning the resulting portions to several players in a way that each of the players feels to have received a ``fair'' amount of the cake. An important…
Cake-cutting is a fundamental model of dividing a heterogeneous resource, such as land, broadcast time, and advertisement space. In this study, we consider the problem of dividing a discrete cake fairly in which the indivisible goods are…
We study the discrete variation of the classical cake-cutting problem where n players divide a 1-dimensional cake with exactly (n-1) cuts, replacing the continuous, infinitely divisible "cake" with a necklace of discrete, indivisible…
This paper extends the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation in which the "cake" is divided among families. Each piece of cake is owned and used simultaneously by all members of the family. A typical example of such a cake is land. We…
We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show…
The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing the fair and efficient allocation of a divisible, heterogeneous resource among agents with distinct preferences. Focusing on a standard formulation of cake cutting, in which…
We consider the problem of envy-free cake cutting, which is the distribution of a continuous heterogeneous resource among self interested players such that nobody prefers what somebody else receives to what they get. Existing work has…
In this note we study a problem of fair division in the absence of full information. We give an algorithm which solves the following problem: n $\ge$ 2 persons want to cut a cake into n shares so that each person will get at least 1/n of…
We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying…
Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair according to each agent's individual preferences. However, these…
In the classic problem of fair cake-cutting, a single interval ("cake") has to be divided among n agents with different value measures, giving each agent a single sub-interval with a value of at least 1/n of the total. This paper studies a…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be…
In classic fair division problems such as cake cutting and rent division, envy-freeness requires that each individual (weakly) prefer his allocation to anyone else's. On a conceptual level, we argue that envy-freeness also provides a…
Austin's moving knife procedure was originally introduced to find a consensus division of an interval/circular cake between two agents, each of whom believes that they receive exactly half of the cake. We generalise this in two ways: we…
The cake-cutting problem involves dividing a heterogeneous, divisible resource fairly between $n$ agents. Br\^{a}nzei et al. [6] introduced {\em generalised cut and choose} (GCC) protocols, a formal model for representing cake-cutting…
A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious.…
We consider the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good ("cake") among several agents with different valuations. Classic cake-cutting procedures either allocate each agent a collection of disconnected pieces, or assume that…
We investigate the problem of fairly dividing a divisible heterogeneous resource, also known as a cake, among a set of agents who may have different entitlements. We characterize the existence of a connected strongly-proportional allocation…
We study the disproportionate version of the classical cake-cutting problem: how efficiently can we divide a cake, here $[0,1]$, among $n$ agents with different demands $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$ summing to $1$? When all the…
This article deals with the cake cutting problem. In this setting, there exists two notions of fair division: proportional division (when there are n players, each player thinks to get at least 1/n of the cake) and envy-free division (each…