Related papers: A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic
This article considers a two-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker)…
We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…
We study the repeated congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources, and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the following question: given a model of…
We prove that a deterministic n-person shortest path game has a Nash equlibrium in pure and stationary strategies if it is edge-symmetric (that is (u,v) is a move whenever (v,u) is, apart from moves entering terminal vertices) and the…
We study a heterogeneous routing game in which vehicles might belong to more than one type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of various types of vehicles over that edge. We relax the…
We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent knows that the number of agents using an edge is within a…
A multiclass queue with many servers is considered, where customers make a join-or-leave decision upon arrival based on queue length information, without knowing the scheduling policy or the state of other queues. A game theoretic…
We study the convergence time of the best response dynamics in player-specific singleton congestion games. It is well known that this dynamics can cycle, although from every state a short sequence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium…
To facilitate effective, safe deployment in the real world, individual robots must reason about interactions with other agents, which often occur without explicit communication. Recent work has identified game theory, particularly the…
In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…
Nash`s classical bargaining solution suggests that n players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the…
This paper studies a class of network games with linear-quadratic payoffs and externalities exerted through a strictly concave interaction function. This class of game is motivated by the diminishing marginal effects with peer influences.…
We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of the game is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably their actions should not anticipate the future values of their types. When…
In this work, we consider the problem of autonomous racing with multiple agents where agents must interact closely and influence each other to compete. We model interactions among agents through a game-theoretical framework and propose an…
Given a network with a continuum of users at some origins, suppose that the users wish to reach specific destinations, but that they are not indifferent to the time needed to reach their destination. They may have several possibilities (of…
We study dynamic network flows and introduce a notion of instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) requiring that for any positive inflow into an edge, this edge must lie on a currently shortest path towards the respective sink. We measure…
We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework,…
Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…