Related papers: Finite-state Strategies in Delay Games (full versi…

An average-time game is played on the infinite graph of configurations of a finite timed automaton. The two players, Min and Max, construct an infinite run of the automaton by taking turns to perform a timed transition. Player Min wants to…

We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…

This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…

A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2 x 2 matrix games is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire…

We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we…

In the present work, we study deterministic mean field games (MFGs) with finite time horizon in which the dynamics of a generic agent is controlled by the acceleration. They are described by a system of PDEs coupling a continuity equation…

We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its expected payoff against the worst-case transitions within…

We consider the previously defined notion of finite-state independence and we focus specifically on normal words. We characterize finite-state independence of normal words in three different ways, using three different kinds of asynchronous…

We present an approach for systematically anticipating the actions and policies employed by \emph{oblivious} environments in concurrent stochastic games, while maximizing a reward function. Our main contribution lies in the synthesis of a…

Real-world processes often exhibit temporal separation between actions and reactions - a characteristic frequently ignored in many modelling frameworks. Adding temporal aspects, like time delays, introduces a higher complexity of problems…

We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…

Something is definitely wrong. If the game has a linear winning strategy, then it is tractable. What's going on? Well, we describe a two-person game which has a definite winner, that is, a player who can force a win in a finite number of…

Obliging games have been introduced in the context of the game perspective on reactive synthesis in order to enforce a degree of cooperation between the to-be-synthesized system and the environment. Previous approaches to the analysis of…

In this paper we describe an approach to resolve strategic games in which players can assume different types along the game. Our goal is to infer which type the opponent is adopting at each moment so that we can increase the player's odds.…

Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…

We consider finite horizon stochastic mean field games in which the state space is a network. They are described by a system coupling a backward in time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and a forward in time Fokker-Planck equation. The…

Partial differential equations with discrete (concentrated) state-dependent delays in the space of continuous functions are investigated. In general, the corresponding initial value problem is not well posed, so we find an additional…

We propose a new method to design adaptation algorithms that guarantee a certain prescribed level of performance and are applicable to systems with nonconvex parameterization. The main idea behind the method is, given the desired…

Many real-world games contain parameters which can affect payoffs, action spaces, and information states. For fixed values of the parameters, the game can be solved using standard algorithms. However, in many settings agents must act…

We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the…